

Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism

Criteria for the Selection of Products

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Preface/Acknowledgements

This paper has been prepared for the ICTSD Informal Roundtable on “Special Products and Special Safeguard Mechanism in the WTO Agriculture Negotiations” to be held in Geneva on 30 September 2004. It is intended to provide background information and analysis to promote discussion at the Roundtable. It has been commissioned by ICTSD. However the views expressed in the paper are those of the author alone.

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Abbreviations

AoA	WTO Agreement on Agriculture
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic product
GNP	Gross National Product
HS	Harmonised System of Tariffs
ICTSD	International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
LI/RP	Low Income and Resource Poor
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
TRQ	Tariff Rate Quota
SP	Special Product
SSM	Special Safeguard Mechanism
WTO	World Trade Organisation

1. Introduction

On 1 August 2004, WTO Members agreed on a framework in agriculture which will constitute the basis for the negotiations of full modalities in the next phase of the negotiations (WTO, 2004).

Paragraph 41 of the framework states that: "Developing countries will have the flexibility to designate an appropriate number of products as Special Products, based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs." The text also indicates that the criteria and treatment of special products will be further specified.

In addition, paragraph 42 states that a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) will be established for use by developing countries, the details of which will be developed in the next phase of the negotiations.

No guidance is provided in the framework paper on the criteria for selecting SPs or products to be subject to the SSM. However, in the course of future negotiations, it is inevitable that parameters will be set within which developing countries can select products that will be subject to the Special Product (SP) and SSM modalities.

The purpose of this discussion paper is to provide inputs and raise ideas on a set of criteria within which developing countries might select SPs, building on the criteria of food and livelihood security and rural development identified in Annex A of the July package agreed in the WTO. In addition, the paper is also intended to contribute to discussions on identifying criteria for the selection of products to be covered by the SSM.

2. Criteria for Selecting Products

Many of the potential beneficiaries of SPs and the SSM would support a means of selecting them that is as broad as possible and provides them with maximum flexibility and the broadest range of products. On the other hand, countries with concerns about the implications of the modalities on the depth of agricultural liberalisation by developing countries (such as the Cairns Group and the US) are likely to support a means of selecting products that is as rigid and limited in number as possible.

The Harbinson modalities text (WTO, 2002) provides a number of options for how SPs would be selected:

- “Developing countries shall designate the primary agricultural products that constitute the predominant staple in their traditional diet. These agricultural products shall not be subject to the [market access modalities]/[reduction commitments].
- Developing countries shall have the flexibility to exclude from the tariff reduction modalities any primary agricultural product in respect of which one or more of the following conditions apply:
 - (a) The product in question is a predominant staple in the traditional diet of the developing country [and is not exported].
 - (b) The exclusion of the product in question reflects a food security, rural development, [product diversification] [poverty alleviation] concern.
 - (c) Substantial trade liberalisation has already been undertaken for the product concerned, either as part of a structural adjustment programme sponsored by a multilateral agency, or as part of the WTO accession process.
- The products in respect of which new tariff bindings have been negotiated under GATT XXVII shall not be covered by these modalities.
- Developing countries shall define a list of agricultural products that will be subject to further reduction commitments.”

Fewer options are provided for in the Harbinson text on how products subject to the SSM would be selected. However, the following are provided:

- “All agricultural products shall be covered by the SSM if in conformity with the conditions laid out”.
- “It shall only be available where imports are subsidised or benefit from domestic support and where there is domestic production of the product concerned”.

There are broadly three options for how SPs and products subject to the SSM would be selected: self selection; limit the number, categorised by HS code; or use screening criteria.

2.1 Self Selection

Under this option, countries would provide a list of products in their schedules. This self selection could be completely un-challenged. Alternatively, there might be a requirement that selected products comply with a specified definition and that this compliance would be open to review by WTO members. This definition might be similar to those provided in the Harbinson modalities text for SPs, as outlined above.

It is likely that self selection would be popular with those intending to use the SP and SSM modalities to significantly restrict the range of products that would be subject to the main market access disciplines in the AoA. However, without any specific limits on the use of the modalities, there is a danger that the modalities would be abused – assessment of compliance of a selection of products with a pre-stated definition would be highly subjective.

2.2 Limit Number, Categorised by HS Code

As suggested in the Harbinson modalities text and proposed by the G20, the total number of SPs a developing country can nominate could be limited in number at the 4 or 6 digit HS level. It is difficult to say which would be more appropriate. The advantage of using the 4 digit level is that non-trade indicators (such as production and consumption data) that might be used for screening are more likely to be available at this classification than at the 6 digit level. On the other hand, classifying products in more detail would mean that the flexibilities provided for would be more specifically targeted. Overall, the appropriate HS level for classification will depend on the criteria used to define products and the level of detail the data required to assess these criteria is available.

The problem with limiting the number of products by number defined by the HS nomenclature is that it could lead to reduction commitments that result in very different levels of distortion depending on the country and products selected. For example it could result in a situation where a small economy whose agricultural imports are dominated by a small number of products at the 6 digit level would be able to nominate all of these products. Whether or not this would be justified depends very much on the specific situation. However it is clear that this could lead to relatively different levels of tariff reduction commitments between countries depending on how diversified their agricultural imports are.

2.3 Screening Criteria

Alternatively, screening criteria could be applied which would limit the range or number of products that developing countries could nominate. Products fitting these criteria would not automatically qualify – they would be selected by developing countries themselves. But the screening would exclude certain products from the selection process. The remainder of this section considers possible criteria that could be applied for screening.

Ideally, indicators used for this screening should meet several criteria. They should be:

1. Objectively verifiable and specific.
2. Readily available.
3. If possible, linked to the stated objectives of the modalities. These relate to domestic food production, particularly in key staples and to the employment, food security and livelihood opportunities of the rural poor.

One of the key challenges that emerges in conceiving of screening criteria relates to data availability. If included in members' schedules, the products would need to be identified according to the HS nomenclature (as suggested in the Harbinson modalities text). However many of the indicators available that would link products to the objectives of the SP and SSM modalities (such as rural employment and food security) are not available in this format in an internationally accepted and therefore objectively verifiable format.

Examples of indicators that might otherwise seem appropriate, but that can not be linked to HS nomenclature (either because of non-existent data or because data that does exist is not classified in an HS format) include:

- Number of people employed in the production of the product – no data in HS format.
- Land area under cultivation - no data in HS format.¹
- Marketed production (as a percentage of total production) – no data.
- Basic crops (not processed or of high value) - difficult to define.
- Products predominantly produced by low income resource poor farmers - no data.

Given these difficulties, table 1 provides a list of indicators that could be used for the screening of products for which data is readily available. It also provides possible justifications for the use of these criteria with comments on how relevant these justifications are to the objectives of the SP and SSM modalities. The justifications provided are drawn from arguments made by those supporting exemption from reduction commitments of “food security crops” in developing countries. However, as the text in the table suggests, these justifications are sometimes questionable.

To provide an indication of how these criteria might be used and of their implications for screening, they are applied to six countries in OPM (2003a): Brazil, Egypt, India, Malaysia, Mauritius and Nigeria. These countries were picked to represent a broad range of country characteristics, including a small island developing state, a highly competitive agricultural exporter, and a Net Food Importing Developing Country. Thresholds were selected for each of the criteria.² These clearly could be revised, but no matter what level they are set at, they will inevitably be arbitrary.

This analysis demonstrated the following:

1. The products that would be eligible to be nominated depend very much on the screening criteria applied.
2. For each criteria, any fixed thresholds will produce a very different number of products that would be eligible for each country, due to specific country characteristics. For example, Criteria 5 screens out a relatively small number of products for all countries, whereas Criteria 3 screens out a large number. Additionally, small states (such as Mauritius) are generally more dependent on imports for consumption than large states (such as India), meaning that they will be entitled to nominate many more products if the criteria relates to dependence on imports for consumption (Criteria 2 and 4).

¹ It is also unlikely that this would be appropriate because, for example, of differing intensities with which crops are farmed and the fact that pastoral livestock production has no fixed area for production.

² Except for Criteria 8 where the product selection is self-apparent.

Table 1: Possible Criteria to Screen Products Subject to the SP and SSM Modalities

	Criteria	Data required	Justification	Relevance to SP and SSM Objectives, Comments & Risks
1	Exports of product X account for less than A% of world exports.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exports of X from country Y. World exports of X. 	An indicator that the production of X in country Y is not highly competitive in world markets and so may need special protection.	<p>Unclear. However may reassure developed countries concerned about the use of protection through the SP and SSM modalities by highly competitive exporters.</p> <p>Smaller countries would be more likely to meet this criteria, regardless of the competitiveness of their exports.</p>
2	Country not a net exporter of product X.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exports of X from country Y. Imports of X to country Y. 	An indicator that the production of X in country Y is not highly competitive in world markets and so may need special protection.	<p>Unclear. However may reassure developed countries concerned about the use of protection through the SP and SSM modalities by highly competitive exporters.</p> <p>Risk that this would rule out the inclusion of many cash crops produced by LI/RP farmers predominantly for the export market and could result in incentives that induced farmers to switch away from the production of cash crops towards subsistence crops.</p>
3	Imports more than A% of total consumption.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Imports of X. Total consumption of X. 	<p>Import penetration relatively high. Means justification for protection is stronger.</p> <p>Precedent for relating imports to domestic consumption has already been set in for TRQs.</p>	<p>Links between imports of food and food security not clear. Although closely related to the objective of enhancing domestic food production, barriers to food imports where dependency on these imports is high is likely to reduce rather than enhance food security.</p> <p>An alternative (and equally valid) argument would be that where dependency on imports for consumption is high, the justification for maintaining high trade barriers is less, due to the relatively large impact this will have for consumers.</p>
4	Consumption of product X is greater than domestic production.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production of X. Consumption of X. 	The country is a net importer: an indicator that the production of X in country Y is not highly competitive in world markets.	Unclear. However may reassure developed countries concerned about protection under the SP modality by highly competitive exporters.

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	Criteria	Data required	Justification	Relevance to SP Objectives, Comments & Risks
5	Consumption of product X more than A% of total domestic consumption.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Calorific value of production of X. • Total calorific consumption. 	Product is important in the local diet and therefore deserves protection.	<p>Although closely related to objective of enhancing domestic food production, barriers to food imports where dependency on these imports is high is likely to reduce rather than enhance food security.</p> <p>An alternative (and equally valid) argument would be that where dependency on imports for consumption is high, the justification for maintaining high trade barriers is less due to the relatively large impact this will have for consumers.</p>
6	Production accounts for more than A% of agricultural value added (or GDP).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Value of production (data not readily available, but could be reported by countries). • Agriculture as % GDP. • Value of GDP. 	Strategic importance of the product in the agriculture sector (or economy).	Rapid opening of trade regime may therefore have serious effects on the agriculture sector (or the economy).
7	Total of all products account for less than A% of total imports (or agricultural imports).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Value of imports of products covered. • Value of total imports. • (Value of total agricultural imports). 	Limits low tariff reduction commitments to a specified proportion of total imports (agricultural imports), therefore limiting the extent of trade distortion.	Not clear, but would be a useful way of limiting impact on overall trade (or agricultural trade). Country free to select either a small number of important products (in terms of imports) or a larger number of less important products.
8	Grains (incl. rice) - SITC Division Code 04: Cereal and cereal preparations.		Many staple crops are grains.	Specifically relates to objective of protecting domestic production of key staples. However probably too limiting because many staple crops are not grains. Additionally, cash crops are often a very important contribution to people's food security.

Given these two broad conclusions, it could be strongly argued that rigid screening criteria (such as Criteria 3, 4, 5 and 6) are too inflexible to be applicable. The criteria suggested are fairly arbitrary in their links to the objectives of the modalities and it would be difficult to justify the resultant list of products screened out over any other selection.

Criteria 2, which has been proposed by some WTO members – that a country should not be a net exporter of the product – would appear to be too restrictive (for the reasons outlined in the final column of table 1). However a requirement that exports account for less than, say 5% world exports (Criteria 1) would be a useful way of screening out selection of goods whose production is highly competitive and which has a significant impact on world markets

It would seem justified that the criteria used must be adapted to take into account country-specific conditions. If this is not the case, the criteria will inevitably bring biases that unfairly advantage some countries over others due to their size or economic structure (as we saw with Criteria 2 and 4).

The only criteria that appear immune to the above problems are Criteria 7 and 8. Criteria 8 (limited to grains) can be ruled out as being too narrow. Criteria 7 (total of all products account for less than A% of total agricultural imports) has the advantage of providing flexibility to developing countries over which products they might nominate. It would also remove the need for debate over whether products should be declared at the 4 or 6 digit level – countries could be given the choice of the level of detail. Less detailed nominations (such as at the 4 digit level) would simply use up a greater proportion of the ceiling percentage each country was entitled to. Moreover, it would provide assurance to WTO members that the trade distorting impact of the modalities would be limited.

There is also the possibility that a combination of screening criteria could be applied. For example, Criteria 7 could be combined with Criteria 1 – i.e. that no product included should account for more than 5% of world exports of that product. This would provide assurance that the modalities would be limited in their distortionary impact.

An alternative to simply defining whether or not countries would be entitled to nominate products would be for some to be entitled to nominate more than others. Applying this would combine the screening criteria assessed above (i.e. limiting the products that countries can nominate) with questions of country differentiation. Conceivably, any of the eight options for screening products provided above could be combined with any number of options for differentiation to determine the limits on the products that individual countries could nominate.

It would seem justifiable that larger countries, which are likely to have more diversified agriculture sectors, and therefore more products that would be sensitive to tariff reduction commitments, be entitled to nominate more products than smaller countries (agricultural production in the smallest island economies might be dominated by one or two commodities). So an indicator of the size of a country (such as population) would be one way to differentiate between countries according to the number of products they would be entitled to nominate.³

Additionally, an indicator of the level of development of the country would also be appropriate. It would seem fair (and politically more acceptable) for richer, more competitive developing countries

³ However politically, this may be problematic because it is the larger countries (such as Brazil and India) that developed country members see as providing the greatest potential for future markets and they are therefore may resist any measure that reduces the degree of liberalisation these countries are obliged to undertake.

to be able to nominate less products than poorer, more food insecure states. There are many ways in which this could be defined. Probably the most simple, internationally recognised indicator, which has a close correlation with most indicators of national food security and economic development would be GNP per capita (in PPP terms).

Table 2 provides a suggested approach for how these two indicators could be combined to derive a number of SPs that a country would be able to nominate. Taking this methodology, India would be allowed to nominate 10 SPs, Nigeria 12, Brazil 4, and Mauritius 1 (see Annex 1).

Table 2: Possible Approach to Specifying the Number of SPs Nominated⁴

GNP per capita (US\$ PPP)	Population					
	0-5 mil	5-20 mil	20-50 mil	50-100 mil	100-500 mil	500+ mil
5000+	1	2	3	3	4	4
4000-5000	1	2	4	4	5	6
3000-4000	2	3	5	5	6	8
2000-3000	2	4	6	7	8	10
1000-2000	3	5	7	8	10	12
0-1000	3	5	8	10	12	15

Given the problems with limiting products by number in terms of an HS categorisation, a preferable alternative would be for the number of SPs that a country could nominate to be limited to a fixed proportion of agricultural imports. Differentiation could be applied by allowing poorer countries to nominate products accounting for a larger share imports, as shown in table 3.⁵ Using an indicator of country size, as in table 2 would not be appropriate to this case. Larger countries would in any case be able to nominate a greater value of imported products as products for any given income level because their total agricultural imports are likely to be greater. Under this methodology, India would be entitled to nominate 23% of its agricultural imports as SP. The percentage would be 40% for Nigeria, 5% for Brazil, and 5% for Mauritius (see Annex 1).

Table 3: Possible Approach to Limiting the Share of Imports Covered by the SP Modality

GNP per capita (US\$ PPP)	% agricultural imports accounted for by SPs
5000+	5
4000-5000	10
3000-4000	16
2000-3000	23
1000-2000	31
0-1000	40

⁴ SPs defined at the four digit level in the HS nomenclature.

⁵ A similar methodology could equally be used for other indicators of food insecurity such as calories per capita per day.

3. Links Between Criteria for SPs and the SSM

Having considered options for how to define SPs and products subject to the SSM, it is important to consider how such criteria would be combined for each of the modalities. There are several plausible options:

- The same criteria be applied to both modalities – i.e. both modalities are applied to the same list of products.
- Different criteria be applied to each modality, but the products selected as SPs could overlap with those selected to be subject to the SSM.
- Different criteria applied to each modality and the products selected as SPs could *not* overlap with those selected to be subject to the SSM.

The first draft of the Harbinson modalities text proposed that developing countries be given the flexibility to apply the SSM on SPs. In the second draft, this was removed. Instead, it simply states that developing countries will be able to apply the SSM on products designated with SSM in their schedules. It does not indicate how SSM products will be selected.

The reasoning behind the removal of the text in the first draft, indicating that the SSM could be applied on SPs, was that some WTO members argued that the SSM should only be applied on products undergoing significant tariff reductions – one of the main arguments for the SSM is that it would provide reassurance to developing countries that they will be able to use tariffs in excess of bound rates to protect sectors undergoing rapid liberalisation against sudden and exceptional import surges. If developing countries were able to apply an SSM on SPs, it would be possible for overall border protection for some products to increase following the Doha Round, rather than fall.

It therefore seems appropriate that each mechanism should apply to a different list of products – those products designated as SPs should be excluded from the SSM. Moreover, as the design of the SSM is likely to be such that it would be applied under specific and exceptional circumstances, it seems appropriate that the criteria for selected products subject to the SSM be far broader and less stringent than the criteria for selecting SPs.

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Annex 1: Indicators of National Food Insecurity and SP Screening Criteria

	GNP pc 1998 (cur int'l US\$) PPP	Population (million)	Number of SPs allowed under approach in Table 2	% agricultural imports accounted for by SPs using Table 3 methodology
Afghanistan		27.2		
Albania *	2.864.20	3.2	2	23
Algeria **	4.595.10	30.8	4	10
Angola *	998.80	13.5	5	40
Antigua/Barbuda *	8.889.80	0.1	1	5
Argentina *	11.727.80	37.5	3	5
Armenia **	2.073.90	3.8	2	23
Azerbaijan **	2.167.60	8.1	4	23
Bahamas **	13.989.80	0.3	1	5
Bahrain *	11.555.70	0.7	1	23
Bangladesh *	1.406.70	133.3	10	31
Barbados *		0.3		
Belarus **	6.314.30	10.0	2	5
Belize *	4.367.40	0.2	1	10
Benin *	857.30	6.4	5	40
Bermuda		0.1		
Bhutan **	1.438.10	0.8	3	31
Bolivia *	2.205.00	8.5	4	23
Bosnia/Herze. **		4.1		
Botswana *	5.796.40	1.7	1	5
Brazil *	6.460.00	172.4	4	5
Brunei Darism *	24.885.50	0.3	1	5
Bulgaria *	4.683.10	8.0	2	10
Burkina Faso *	865.70	11.6	5	40
Burundi *	561.00	6.9	5	40
Cambodia **	1.245.50	12.3	5	31
Cameroon *	1.394.70	15.2	5	31
Cape Verde **	3.192.00	0.4	2	16
Central African Republic *				
Cayman Is	1.098.00	3.8	3	31
Chad *	842.50	7.9	5	40
Chile *	8.507.30	15.4	2	5
China *	3.051.40	1.271.9	8	16
China HK SAR *	20.763.10	6.7	2	5
Colombia *	5.861.40	43.0	7	5
Comoros	1.399.80	0.6	3	31
Conao DR *	733.30	52.4	10	40
Conao Rep. *	846.40	3.1	1	40
Costa Rica *	5.811.80	3.9	3	5
Cote d'Ivoire *	1.483.60	16.4	2	31
Croatia *	6.697.90	4.4	1	5
Cuba *		11.2		

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Diibouti *		0.6		
Dominica *	4.777.40	0.1	1	10
Dominican Rep. *	4.337.10	8.5	2	10
Ecuador *	3.003.40	12.9	3	16
Egypt *	3.146.10	65.2	5	16
El Salvador *	4.007.50	6.4	2	10
Eq. Guinea		0.5		
Eritrea	983.80	4.2	3	40
Estonia *	7.562.80	1.4	1	5
Ethiopia **	565.70	65.8	10	40
Fiji *	4.093.60	0.8	1	10
Fr. Polynesia		0.2		
Gabon *	5.615.20	1.3	1	5
Gambia *	1.427.70	1.3	3	31
Georgia *	3.429.20	5.3	3	16
Ghana *	1.734.70	19.7	5	31
Grenada *	5.557.50	0.1	1	5
Guatemala *	3.473.90	11.7	3	16
Guinea *	1.721.90	7.6	5	31
Guinea Bissau *	573.20	1.2	3	40
Guyana *	3.138.50	0.8	2	16
Haiti *	1.378.80	8.1	5	31
Honduras *	2.338.10	6.6	4	23
Hungary *	9.831.60	10.2	2	5
India *	2.059.70	1.032.4	10	23
Indonesia *	2.407.20	209.0	8	23
Iran	5.120.90	64.5	3	5
Iraq		23.8		
Israel *	16.860.60	6.4	2	5
Jamaica *	3.344.40	2.6	2	16
Jordan *	2.615.40	5.0	2	23
Kazakhstan **	4.316.70	14.9	2	10
Kenya *	964.00	30.7	8	40
Kiribati	3.879.90	0.1	2	16
Korea PDR		22.4		
Korea Rep. *	13.286.30	47.3	3	5
Kuwait *		2.0		
Kyrgyzstan *	2.246.80	5.0	2	23
Lao PDR **	1.683.10	5.4	5	31
Latvia *	5.776.60	2.4	1	5
Lebanon **	4.144.30	4.4	1	10
Lesotho *	2.194.30	2.1	2	23
Liberia		3.2		
Libya		5.4		
Lithuania *	6.282.80	3.5	1	5
Macau *		0.4		
Macedonia FYR **	4.223.80	2.0	1	10

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	GNP pc 1998 (cur int'l US\$) PPP	Population (million)	Number of SPs allowed under approach in Table 2	% agricultural imports accounted for by SPs using Table 3 methodology
Malawi *	551.20	10.5	5	40
Malaysia *	7.698.70	23.8	3	5
Maldives *	3.435.50	0.3	2	16
Mali *	672.50	11.1	5	40
Mauritania *	1.500.50	2.7	3	31
Mauritius *	8.236.40	1.2	1	5
Mexico *	7.450.50	99.4	3	5
Moldova *	1.994.70	4.3	3	31
Monolia *	1.463.00	2.4	3	31
Morocco *	3.188.40	29.2	5	16
Mozambique *	739.70	18.1	5	40
Myanmar		48.3		
N. Mariana Is		0.1		
Namibia *	5.279.60	1.8	1	5
Nepal **	1.180.60	23.6	7	31
Neth. Antilles		0.2		
New Caledonia		0.2		
Nicaragua *	1.896.20	5.2	5	31
Niger *	729.20	11.2	5	40
Nigeria *	739.60	129.9	12	40
Oman *		2.5		
Pakistan *	1.651.80	141.5	10	31
Panama *	4.925.40	2.9	1	10
Papua New Guinea *	2.204.60	5.3	4	23
Paraguay *	4.312.20	5.6	2	10
Peru *	4.180.30	26.3	4	10
Philippines *	3.724.80	78.3	5	16
Poland *	7.543.10	38.6	3	5
Qatar *	5.571.90	0.6		
Romania *	6.179.70	22.4		
Russian Fed. **		144.8	3	5
Rwanda *		8.7		
S. Tome/Princ. **	1.289.00	0.2	3	31
Samoa **	3.854.00	0.2	2	16
Saudi Arabia **	10.498.20	21.4	3	5
Senegal *	1.296.60	9.8	5	31
Sevchelles **	10.185.20	0.1	1	5
Sierra Leone *	445.40	5.1	5	40
Singapore *	25.295.30	4.1	1	5
Slovak Rep. *	9.623.50	5.4	2	5
Slovenia *	14.399.70	2.0	1	5
Solomon Is *	1.904.40	0.4	3	31
Somalia		9.1		
South Africa *	8.295.90	43.2	3	5
Sri Lanka *	2.945.10	18.7	4	23
St Kitts/Nevis *	9.789.70	0.0	1	5
St Lucia *	4.897.30	0.2	1	10

Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism: Criteria for the Selection of Products

	GNP pc 1998 (cur int'l US\$) PPP	Population (million)	Number of SPs allowed under approach in Table 2	% agricultural imports accounted for by SPs using Table 3 methodology
Suriname *		0.4		
Swaziland *	4.195.10	1.1	1	10
Svria	2.702.20	16.6	5	23
Taiikistan **	1.040.90	6.2	5	31
Tanzania *	482.90	34.4	8	40
Thailand *	5.523.80	61.2	8	5
Togo *	1.351.60	4.7	1	31
Tonga **	4.187.30	0.1	1	10
Trinidad/Tobago *	7.208.20	1.3	1	5
Tunisia *	5.169.00	9.7	2	5
Turkev *	6.594.50	66.2	3	5
Turkmenistan		5.4		
Uganda *	1.072.40	22.8	5	31
Ukraine **	3.130.40	49.1	5	16
Uruguav *	8.541.30	3.4	1	5
Uzbekistan **	2.044.10	25.1	6	23
Vanuatu **	2.892.40	0.2	2	23
Venezuela *	5.705.60	24.6	3	5
Vietnam **	1.688.60	79.5	8	31
Yemen **	657.50	18.0	5	40
Zambia *	677.90	10.3	5	40
Zimbabwe *	2,489.20	12.8	4	23
Threshold	<2500			

Notes:

- Blank cells indicate data not available.
- * Denotes WTO members (on 1 January 2002).
- ** Denotes WTO observer governments (on 1 January 2002).