After countless late night hours over two weeks of intense wrangling on a set of contentious issues, negotiators at COP 17 in Durban finalised a package of agreements on the way forward to combat climate change. Given the hurdles negotiators faced heading into Durban, the result is indeed a remarkable achievement.

The agreements do not represent the most desirable, but rather the most realistic outcome possible under the prevailing political circumstances. In the words of South Africa’s COP president Maite Nkoana Mashabane, “I think we all realise they’re not perfect, but we should not let the perfect become the enemy of the good and the possible.”

Reading about the key fault-line that hampered the last-minute deal one gets a strong sense of deja-vu. The tussle between India and the EU over the details of how legally binding future provisions of climate a change framework should be for non-Annex I parties - and the exact wording involved - echoes earlier debates that have taken place since the dawn of climate negotiations on equity and historical responsibility.

While understanding the need for developed countries to pioneer climate mitigation efforts, from an environmental perspective, the important question may be: what do internationally binding laws matter for actual climate-related mitigation measures on the ground?

The “tortoise” world of policy and negotiations appears to be often one, if not several steps behind the “hare” world of ground-level climate action initiatives - which admittedly is still far short of the scale needed to keep global warming within the 2°C threshold. One gets a strong sense of this while attending the various meetings of parties - including the plenary sessions - as compared with various side-events that highlighted private-sector as well as government and NGO-led initiatives on the ground.

In the former, progress on several contentious issues, such as the economic and social consequences of response measures, moved at snail’s - or tortoise - pace with talks stretching late into the night-making one wonder as delegates-seemed to draw upon seemingly infinite reserves - unlike fossil fuels - of human energy and patience debating what sentences or words to include or not in texts that would shape a final agreement.

On the other hand presentations and discussions made at several of the external side-events and symposiums taking place across the city of Durban reflect a very different landscape as far as momentum is concerned. At the Trade and Climate Change Symposium - organised by ICTSD, the World Trade Organization and South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry - one of the sessions discussed the possibilities of harnessing trade for climate change mitigation including through a Sustainable Energy Trade Initiative or Agreement. Here, one speaker mentioned India’s high level of ambition on scaling up renewable energy - particularly the solar sector. The speaker also pointed to India’s innovative schemes of trading in renewable energy and energy efficiency certificates introduced or in the pipeline as part of the country’s National Action Plans on Climate Change. Similar far-reaching initiatives were also reportedly underway in China.

At the closing plenary of the symposium on 6 December as well as well as at an event launching the South Africa Renewables Initiative (SaRI), Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies underscored the importance of Africa not missing the “green” industrial revolution. He also highlighted ambitious plans to scale up renewable energy in South Africa, a country dependent on coal to provide the lion’s share - some 90 percent - of its energy needs by attracting a greater level of private sector investments.

Mind the (gigaton) gap: Bridging intention and implementation

Could strong domestic climate laws be a substitute for international obligations? Certainly it would provide a strong signal to the global community and the private sector about a country’s seriousness of intent to reduce greenhouse gases and perhaps also help expand the carbon market. So far as attracting climate-friendly investments from the private sector are concerned, strong, stable and legally enforceable domestic climate change laws, policies and incentives may also do the same. This is already happening in developing countries and will evolve further.

Durban paved the way for a future framework with “legal provisions that are enforceable.” Any legal provisions applicable to non-Annex I countries in such an agreement may very well reflect the current state of domestic climate law in these countries. While the deal marks a qualified victory for multilateralism, Durban may have little effect on private sector action. In the words of one private sector representative in Durban, “business will shrug its shoulders over Durban and wait for direction from national capitals.”

The dangers of failing to respond to the climate imperative are well known, particularly for developing countries. The UN estimates a six gigaton gap between how much the world has pledged to cut carbon and how much carbon emissions need to come down to stop global warming according to the science.

What matters is that even if the major GHG emitting countries - whether developed or developing - do make binding commitments internationally, is ultimately the willingness and capacity to implement them that will make the difference. Willingness matters as there are no penalties - unlike in the WTO-led trade system - for backtracking on climate-related commitments, even for Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol.

Capacity may be even more critical. With competing development-related priorities and relatively constrained public treasuries that may not be able to support renewables indefinitely - even China - they will need to focus on “win-win” opportunities: combining climate-change, jobs, and economic development. Even richer countries, with the best intentions, have been finding it difficult to scale up renewables and energy-efficiency of an order big enough to significantly reduce dependence on fossil-fuels. This will be even truer for countries that have several times the number of poor and unemployed than the most recession-hit prosperous countrys.

The shortfall of public financing efforts implies that it may need to be leveraged so as to best attract complementary private-sector investments. Despite a reluctance to turn to private-sector financing for the Green Climate Fund, many developing countries already recognise the importance of private sector involvement and are taking steps to attract such investments in climate-friendly sectors -another example of the discord between the world of climate negotiations and practise.

Brightening the future for climate and development

It is clear that both developed and developing countries will need to put in an effort to row against the tide of climate change - one that will affect the latter even more adversely. But as developing countries continue to build economic muscle, the developed world will need to man the bigger oars. As far as the future of climate-change negotiations are concerned, success - at least from mitigation perspective - may depend to some extent on changing the nature of emphasis from economic “burdens” to “opportunities.” A stronger focus on emission reduction initiatives and targets - both in the developed as well as developing world - that simultaneously resolve development-related needs and create development-related opportunities may provide a sounder basis for a future climate-related agreement.

A good example of this and a positive note on which to end comes from a 9 December newspaper article which states that South Africa would be the first country in Africa to phase out energy-guzzling incandescent bulbs by 2016. While the energy saving effects have not been quantified it is estimated that a switch from incandescent to CFLs and LEDs could save enough energy to light 4 million homes. The initiative was part of a partnership between UNEP and major light bulb manufacturers Osram and Philips that could provide a promising template for future UNFCCC-led initiatives as well. If such an initiative were to be scaled up to a global level, UNEP estimates it would save total electricity equivalent to all the electricity used in the UK and Denmark - more than half of India’s total consumption.

Such a lighting initiative - whether through appropriate national laws or an internationally binding agreement - could enable many more people to benefit from expanded electric power without increasing emissions-brightening prospects for both climate as well as development. So while roadmaps are essential, what may matter more is not the road to a certain destination-rather ability and willingness to drive there…hopefully in a sustainably-powered electric car.

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According to Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “the ‘climate change problem’ is actually many distinct problems-each with its own attributes, administrative challenges and distinctive political constituencies.” This truism, exhaustively scrutinised by academics in search of optimal or first best solutions to international cooperative action, has been loudly attested to in Durban this week. With some dramatic tones in speeches and actions on Friday night, linkages to trade were not speared from the resulting acrimony.

Concerns that actions taken in the name of climate may create distortions to competitiveness are a main obstacle for many countries in moving ahead with mitigation efforts. And claims that mitigation measures unduly disadvantage trading partners render any such effort bitterly contentious. Indeed, any attempt to address the numerous interlinkages between trade and climate in the context of an eventual framework for an integrated, comprehensive climate regime, continues to end in rancor.

Australia faced bitter opposition to the introduction of its carbon tax - much on fears of alleged competitiveness loss - and it is well known that similar apprehension explains why it is so hard for the US to advance on its climate change initiatives. A most illustrative case is the recent decision of the EU to include aviation into its emissions trading system. The EU - frustrated over the lack of progress in addressing one crucial source of greenhouse gas emissions, international transport, through international cooperation - will include flights operating in European airspace from 2012, irrespective of the origin of the airline. In response, developing countries in particular claim that the principle of common but differentiated responsibility is being side-stepped, as no exceptions are made for their airlines, and all countries, from the largest economies to humble island states, that rely on air transport for trade are concerned about the effects on the competitiveness of their trade, including tourism.

There are a range of other issues that tie the two worlds of trade and climate change - which, incidentally, collide this year with back-to-back UNFCCC COP and WTO Ministerial Conference - together, such as subsidies, standards and labels, and free allocation of emissions allowances.

Important opportunities exist for trade to contribute to effective climate change mitigation and adaptation; these merit their place in the official debate so they are able to optimise their potential positive impacts. Among these opportunities are trade in climate friendly goods and technologies - in relation to sustainable energy in particular.

Some critics argue that discussing trade in the context of the UNFCCC is too complicated, and that climate negotiators are not trained on trade issues. While the latter may be true to some extent, this is changing. What is most difficult to understand is why some would suggest that a forum like the UNFCCC should ignore an issue that so directly influences - and is influenced by - climate change.

Indeed, not talking about concerns does not make them go away. It’s hiding in a fire. The fire will not disappear if you pretend it is not there. On the contrary, the longer you hide, the more difficult it becomes to escape.

It is true that the UNFCCC is not a trade organisation, and parts of the discussions on trade and climate change should take place in other fora - most notably the WTO. Some issues do however deserve a forum for discussion in the context of the UNFCCC. Our assessment is that this is necessary in order to allow for countries to better understand the trade linkages. Preferably, this would happen at an early stage, so they can draw from lessons learned from previous experiences, building up a body of knowledge of what works and what does not. This is crucial to ensure that inefficient or even damaging measures can be avoided in favour of better options.

ICTSD has proposed that a forum on response measures - introduced as a possibility in Cancun and under discussion here in Durban - would host some of the trade discussions. This proposition resonates well in particular with the G77 and China. Developing countries are particularly concerned about the use of unilateral trade measures - such as border carbon measures - and levies on transport and carbon footprinting.

Developed countries, on the other hand, are generally more reluctant to establish a forum. First, they usually argue that trade belongs in the WTO. Second, developed countries have an aversion to the very concept of response measures; the concept has traditionally applied to compensating oil-producing economies for a projected decreased demand of petroleum products as a consequence of climate change mitigation. Thirdly, and importantly, these countries may wish to avoid a discussion that could lead to a possible strengthening of rules that could decrease their space to use the tools they deem necessary to mitigate climate change.

In Durban, intense negotiations have been stretching long into the night over establishing a forum on response measures. Positions are certainly diverse. Some developing countries are pushing for the establishment of a permanent forum, which would meet twice a year and address an open-ended range of issues. For their part, some developed country parties are insisting that the potential forum consolidate all discussions on response measures that would otherwise appear in as many as seven different places under the bodies of the UNFCCC. Yet some other parties are pushing for minimalist solutions, or none at all - tantamount to leaving it the matter to court interpretation of existing international norms.

A compromise solution has been put forward in one draft Kyoto Protocol text, which has something for everyone - a permanent forum for the G77, but the exclusion of the mention of “response measures,” to satisfy those opposing Annex I countries. The question is controversial indeed, but the reason why no agreement has been reached does not necessarily depend on a polarisation on these specific issues. Instead, it may rather reflect a reluctance to agree on this until there is more clarity on the process ahead regarding the “big picture,” and a wish to keep this - and other strategic issues - as bargaining chips to help strengthen their position on a final deal…when, and if, it finally materialises.

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With less than 48 hours left to clinch a deal at UNFCCC COP 17 in Durban, many analysts are now saying they are feeling less than optimistic. Following the arrival of ministers earlier this week, there was enough movement on key issues - most notably the Green Climate Fund - that several negotiators were upbeat and positive. But discussions on the Fund appear to be unravelling and positions on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol seem as divergent as ever.

The main issue plaguing the Green Climate Fund talks reportedly focuses on the details surrounding what the Board of the Fund will look like and who will sit on it. Negotiators have described the talks on the Fund in recent days as “hard” and say they are cautious of watering down the text so much so as to agree on an “empty shell.”

It was already established last year in Cancun that the Fund Board will be made up of 24 members, with an equal number of members from developing and developed countries. Positions appear to be divided over what role, if any, the private sector will play in the Board. In general, developing countries are reportedly uncomfortable with the private sector playing a role in the fund. Several developing countries have also expressed their discomfort with the COP’s invitation of the Washington-based World Bank to act as the interim trustee of the Fund.

With most countries looking to strike a “balanced package,” where positions on certain issues can be softened in return for flexibility on other issues, it is unclear whether any party is in a position to offer a ground-breaking shift to get the ball rolling. China’s announcement late last week that they may be willing to agree to binding commitments - under certain circumstances - appears to have not been enough to trigger any major movement on the Kyoto Protocol. And while the EU is the most likely developed country party to help encourage their counterparts to sign on to a second commitment period, UK climate secretary Chris Huhne said they would not back away from a deal with “hard, bankable” commitments.

But Brussels has also said it would not cut a deal on Kyoto unless countries not currently bound by the pact - notably the US and China - begin serious negotiations on a legally-binding treaty under the Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA) track. The LCA Chair introduced a new “amalgamated” text on Wednesday morning, but discussions have been detailed, procedural, and glacial in pace. With “big picture” LCA issues sitting on the back burner for now and the US and China not moving from their familiar positions, the EU desire for broader commitment may have to go unfulfilled.

The next two days will be the most crucial for the two week Durban meet. The closed-door meetings, high-level “indabas,” and informal, unannounced huddles have already created a frenzied atmosphere with those in attendance constantly asking each other if they’ve heard any news. This will only escalate as the closing plenary approaches. In the end, clarity will only truly come at sunrise on Saturday.

Don’t forget to follow our Tweets and read our weekly Updates from Durban.

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With COP17 well underway in Durban, delegates are hard at work on a plethora of issues, with the Kyoto Protocol at the forefront of it all. But while the future of the Kyoto Protocol has generated an unmistakable buzz in the talks so far, other issues have been slowly playing out in the in the shadows.

Technology transfer is one of those issues that has seen some attention in negotiations this week, but, unfortunately, intellectual property issues as a whole appear to be left on the backburner thusfar.

By now it is common knowledge that effectively addressing climate change - especially in developing countries - requires access to innovative and inexpensive technologies. But negotiators seem to have forgotten that these technologies are more often than not protected by intellectual property (IP) rules that govern the way they can be transferred, particularly to developing countries.

Technology talks slowly moving ahead; some issues remain

Last year’s Cancun Agreements established a Technology Mechanism intended “to facilitate the implementation of enhanced action on technology development and transfer in order to support action on mitigation and adaptation to climate change.”

To date, however, the relationship between the two elements of the mechanism - the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) - remains unclear. The hope for Durban was that this issue would be resolved, but talks are moving too slowly to tell.

This week, developing countries, the G77, and others expressed a desire to have a clear mention of the link between the TEC and the CTCN in a decision currently being drafted at a COP contact group on the TEC. The United States, on the other hand, unsurprisingly proposed that the CTCN not be mentioned.

This decision - based on a report presented by TEC Chair Gabriel Blanco - will also combine inputs from the COP’s subsidiary bodies, the SBI and the SBSTA as well as the AWG-LCA contact group on technology development and transfer.

But none of these will be fully operational until the financing issue is resolved.  Talks on financing, and the Green Climate Fund in particular, are still unripe at the moment.

Financing and the relationship between the TEC and the CTCN are therefore the key technology issues on the table and the ones that could make or break any decision made next week.

UNEP and UNEP Risoe Centre this week hosted an excellent side event on a Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) project they have been working on. The event provided valuable insights on identifying the barriers hindering the acquisition, deployment and diffusion of technologies.

But the biggest lesson of the night was during a presentation by Eric Usher from UNEP on the large gap in early stage financing for clean technologies. He noted that “as opposed to other start up businesses, very few financiers invest in clean technologies before financial close.” Bridging this gap, he said, is crucial.

Future of IP in negotiations uncertain

While so many of the issues at play in Durban are intricately tied to intellectual property and the barriers it can create, IP has been conspicuously left out of the discussions. Even India, who submitted a proposal to discuss intellectual property rights in Durban, is apparently considering dropping the issue in the negotiations in favour of advancing talks on equity.

Most countries appear reluctant to bring up the issue at all, perhaps out of a fear that the only way to do it is in extreme terms (i.e., stronger IP or no IP at all).

In that sense, the negotiations at Durban leave something to be desired. But can delegates really do much more? Admittedly there are a lot of issues already on the table, and bringing IP into the mix would complicate things even more. Not to mention that there are other more pressing and anxiety-inducing things to talk about during this COP.

But there is no doubt that in order to effectively address issues of technology and innovation, negotiators are going to have to come to terms with the fact that IP is important and not just a leveraging tool. It is one of, if not the primary mechanism for encouraging investment in the development of adaptation and mitigation technologies.  And these technologies are after all what developing countries need.

As South Africa’s Minister of Science and Technology Naledi Pandor said at a side-event on Wednesday, “We want the latest technology, not the old stuff…We want iPad 3 type of technologies - not iPad 1″.

ICTSD has released a new publication on the issue entitled “Overcoming the Impasse on Intellectual Property and Climate Change at UNFCCC: A Way Forward”. Download it here

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“It always seems impossible until it’s done” are the words from Nelson Mandela that UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christina Figures echoed yesterday in her opening speech for the UN Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC COP 17/CMP 7) in Durban, South Africa. The opening took place in the aftermath of an unseasonable powerful storm which flooded the basements of the conference centre which hosts COP 17 and even caused several deaths in the region, according to reports.

The official slogan for COP 17 is “working together, saving tomorrow today.” And indeed, the question for all countries in Durban will be whether they want to collaborate to save the day and take action on climate change in accordance with the scientific reality of climate change or whether they will continue to get caught up in procedural matters. Looking first at the reality of climate change, emissions of greenhouse gasses have never been higher than in 2010 and this year the world is on track to break that record again. At the same time, limiting global warming to two-degrees Celsius will require emissions to peak by 2020, and to reduce drastically by 2050. Meanwhile, progress in the climate negotiations over the past two years has been procedural at best.

When listening to the negotiators here, it seems like uncertainty remains the one word everyone can agree upon. But they add that that may not be the end of the world; last year’s meeting in Cancun showed that sometimes low expectations may be the best way to get results at climate negotiations. In contrast, the great expectations for Copenhagen to deliver a new binding treaty resulted in disappointment and cost many global leaders a good deal of political capital - leaving them unwilling to make such a gamble the following year. Efforts by delegates to keep ambitions low determine the atmosphere in Durban for now.

Expectations for COP 17: setting the scene

Although a major breakthrough is not expected in Durban, many view the meeting as an important opportunity to deliver both operational decisions and some longer-term signals on the future direction of the process. However, the stakes at Durban remain high.

Most negotiators here in Durban agree that a successful COP 17 will rest on three main pillars:

1.       An arrangement comparable to a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol;

2.       A “Durban Roadmap:” a mandate to conclude negotiations on a legally binding instrument by 2015; and

3.       Implementation of the Cancun mechanisms

These three issues have closer connections than it may appear at first.

As the first “commitment period” - climate jargon for implementation - of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) is running out at the end of 2012, there is need for a deal on a second commitment period. The KP follow-up and the mandate for negotiations on a legally binding instrument by 2015 - a “Durban Roadmap” - are closely linked: the EU, as the only developed country supporter for a second commitment period of the KP, has made clear that its condition for accepting a second commitment period is that there is a mandate for negotiating a legally binding instrument by 2015. The US, in turn, has made clear that due to its legislative process it will be challenging to get a legally binding instrument ratified if it does not include at least the biggest emerging countries.

Equally important here in Durban will be working out the Cancun mechanisms: the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the system of Measurement Reporting and Verification (MRV) of mitigation and finance, the Technology Mechanism and the Adaptation Committee. The Cancun mechanisms should be seen as building blocks that will increase the chances of success towards a legally binding instrument in 2015.

Although the contentious issues at Durban are the GCF and MRV, no country has voiced a formal “no” against them, and there is good hope that leeway will be found to work these issues out.

Without the GCF it will be hard to draw the support of developing countries for a future climate arrangement. Cancun successfully delivered progress on MRV of developing countries mitigation actions, primarily due to skilful diplomacy and brokering by the Mexicans.  However, sensitivities remain over the frequency of reporting and verification and how this is differentiated between developed and developing countries.

Trade impacts increasingly on the radar

Setting up 2015 as the next political moment to secure a below two-degree Celsius global deal will require looking across all aspects of climate change and the potential interlinkages between the different areas, including international trade.

Increasingly, it is recognised that trade is closely related with the impacts of and responses to climate change. In Durban there will be a special “forum” on the impacts of domestic measures taken to combat climate change upon other countries. Originally, “response measures” have been associated with the possible harm to oil-producing economies that may arise from a potential global decrease in oil consumption due to measures on climate change. Increasingly, countries are also interested in discussing climate policies with global trade implications in the response measures forum.

A key goal of ICTSD in Durban is ensure that a possible permanent forum on response measures takes trade and its sustainable development appropriately into account. The WTO may have its dispute settlement body to consider instances where climate-related measures might violate trade rules, but affected countries can only exercise this option after the measure has been adopted. Instead, it would be better to provide a potential instance for conflict avoidance. Also, the WTO only addresses the violation of international trade rules and would not consider the broad spectrum of potential consequences to socio-economic development and impacts to the environment. The UNFCCC would be in a better position to protect these sustainable development dimensions, and such a forum would provide a concrete process for reducing negative and maximising positive impacts.

Negotiations weighed down by trade concerns

Meanwhile, under the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, several trade-related discussions continue. India made a submission for the inclusion of several agenda items for the consideration of COP 17, including access to critical mitigation and adaptation technologies and related intellectual property rights and unilateral trade measures.

First, while the role of intellectual property rights in the deployment and transfer of technologies for climate change remains a concern for many countries, the issue is far from resolved. There is little indication from inter-sessional negotiations or meetings that Durban is poised to make any decisions on this topic, which is among the most contentious subjects under the technology negotiations. It may, nevertheless, get some traction and other innovative processes are underway for the dissemination of clean energy technology.

The issue of unilateral trade measures is related to the question of competitiveness, where some countries fear that action to reduce climate emissions will negatively impact their companies’ and industrial sectors’ competitiveness in international markets. In essence, many developed countries say they will be at a disadvantage if some countries with competing industries are required to do less than others to mitigate emissions at a global level. For their part, developing countries have concerns about the potential use of trade measures by developed countries attempting to “level the playing field.” Poor countries argue that such measures could impact their economic and sustainable development. To pre-empt the use of such measures, they are insisting that language prohibiting the use of unilateral measures to address climate change be included in the new agreement. Similar language is included in a draft text on response measures under the LCA. These discussions are taking place under a sub-category known as the “shared vision,” where parties also discuss the composite emission cuts for the world and how the total agreement balances out.

In a separate sub-group on “sectoral approaches” to mitigation, the topics of agriculture and bunker fuels - dirty fuel used in shipping and aviation - are back on the table in a similar form to what was considered and then dropped in Cancun. The trade implications remain an obvious concern under both of these topics and are reflected in references in the draft texts. The agriculture text proposes the creation of a work programme on both mitigation and adaptation in the agriculture sector. Meanwhile, the bunkers discussion is oriented more toward whether to advance discussions on climate change issues related to global transport under the UNFCCC, rather than under the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as is currently the case. The controversial inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS from 2012 is another topic of hefty discussion in Durban.

Solving honest differences

According to Mahatma Gandhi, who spent 11 years in Durban, “honest differences are often a healthy sign of progress.” Over the next two weeks, governments have to show whether they can leverage their differences in order to make progress on climate action. In any case, ICTSD will continue to report on COP 17 over the next 2 weeks.

Remember to join us as we host our annual Trade and Climate Change Symposium in Durban on 5 and 6 December.

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As another WTO public forum pulls into view this week - an unimaginable event for some of us who struggled to be heard back in the 1990s - the opportunity presents itself to look afresh at the trade system that has evolved since Marrakesh and the role that civil society can play in shaping it into the next decade.

The global trading system and, indeed, global governance have come a long way since the early days of the WTO - a time when those interested in sustainable development faced a radically different landscape. Out of necessity, advocates used to focus on basic issues such as access and transparency, while former Director-General Renato Ruggiero defended the role of the WTO to sceptics as the “ambulance” that would rescue global governance. Today, the concept of access has shifted from “getting documents” to the ability to generate and use knowledge in a complex system. For many the question is no longer whether a monolithic WTO will wrest global governance from the duly elected, but whether it may need an ambulance of its own.

A 1996 Rip Van Winkle waking up in 2011 might be excused for thinking that he had been dropped into a feel good fairy tale. The intervening years have seen immense advances in the involvement of civil society in policymaking, both in Geneva and globally. Policymakers and civil society groups meet frequently and are often seen on the same side of the table, working on solutions to the most difficult problems. The integration of numerous crosscutting - and often contentious - issues have revealed the inevitable challenges for making coherent policies, even as these challenges help define the paths and coalitions for doing so. Countries like China, India, and Brazil have rocketed to economic power and global influence, and many see promising signs of development and potential growth from developing and least-developed countries. Notwithstanding the stagnant Doha negotiations, global and regional trade and integration have continued apace with autonomous liberalisation and a growing multiplicity of regional and bilateral agreements filling the void.

Given the array of institutions and instruments at play, pinning down the exact role the WTO has played in the creation of today’s massive and complex global trade system would likely be an exercise in futility. But there is no doubt that the organisation has helped shape the quickly-changing global landscape of the past 15 years, with civil society playing a key role in the process.

In spite of these accomplishments, however, I maintain that civil society involvement is needed now more than ever. Indeed, the older issues that in past years took priority are now being displaced by new issues that civil society organisations are uniquely suited to pursue.

The new access barriers

While regular WTO symposia and the global proliferation of a more active civil society have been a boon to the world trading system, a new horizon has emerged for civil society to take an even greater role in the policymaking process. On the one hand, those working on trade-related policies now need both more in-depth and cross-disciplinary analysis, along with the capacity to use these in negotiations; on the other hand, policymakers need to be better networked and more aware of challenges and innovations across the global trading system.

More than a decade ago, many groups began to specialise on issues and lead the charge forward into new territory - both substantively and geographically. Their success in raising and advancing issues globally, especially in the context of a trading system that continues to become more geographically diverse, means that the challenges of enhancing knowledge across this system are that much more acute. While the days of global NGO campaigns seem to have faded, there remains a major gap to be filled that links knowledge and practice across issue areas and regions.

The importance of centres of decision making

The global trading system has not just spread out - it has also fundamentally changed from the bipolar world of the 1990s. This new multipolar world means that there are not only opportunities, but also imperatives in supporting communities of leadership in places like Beijing, New Delhi, and Brasilia. The role these centres of decision-making now play - in terms of defining sustainability, in terms of regional trade and growth and, of course, in terms of defining global trade and trade rules - means that cultivating sustainable development communities in these countries should be a top priority for global organisations and a key consideration for those among them seeking to catalyse systemic change. Shifting internal mindsets from that of former aid recipients to new global leaders, while recognising the unique developmental challenges and assets of each, can enrich the global debate about effective models of development.

Defining the next decade of the global trade system

While the future of the Doha Round has been hotly debated, it has unfortunately siphoned a great deal of civil society energy - just as it has with governments - away from attending to the trading system we actually have. Although conflating Doha with the WTO has been a natural evolution, the demise of Doha cannot herald the demise of the global trading system. The robust, interconnected system we know today extends far beyond the WTO, yet depends on the WTO for its full functioning.

Stale arguments around whether to close the Doha Round, change leaders, or pursue another of the myriad proposed solutions have left a gaping hole for civil society to influence what the trading regime can and should look like going forward. For example, systemic issues such as non-tariff barriers and private standards, or how to manage global supply chains and process and production measures in the context of the current rules, will shape the reality we will face in 2020. While autonomous liberalisation continues, new issues - such as energy and climate change - is quickly moving to a higher rank on the global agenda and could be addressed more vigorously in the context of trade.

Finally, civil society organisations have the opportunity to weigh in on how the proliferation of preferential agreements has affected them. Is the system of today a better one for access and progress, or is there a need for a renewed push to multilateralise, simplify, and ensure that access and participation barriers are levelled, rather than further complicated?

Although the public symposium will not be the last chance for civil society organisations to forge a new agenda, these groups should not be deterred by the state of Doha. Instead, they should seize this opportunity to help shape the global trading system on the principles of equity, inclusion, and knowledge-based action that have historically motivated these organisations and on which so many continue to depend.

Andrew Crosby is Managing Director for Operations and Strategy at ICTSD. The views expressed reflect the author’s personal views and not necessarily those of ICTSD.

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After several months of negotiations and five days of talks in Istanbul last week, the UN conference on Least Developed Countries (LDCs) adopted a plan of action on 13 May aimed at helping the world’s poorest countries combat poverty during the upcoming decade.

The discussions had promised a “paradigm shift” from the traditional development approach, but many expressed disappointment with the final ‘plan of action’, since it lacks binding implementation and monitoring mechanisms. The Finnish official who chaired the ‘Committee of the Whole’, the body in charge of the negotiating process, described the deliberations as “difficult and strenuous.”

The plan’s main goal is to halve the number of LDCs by 2020, through a combination of strong economic growth, greater gender equality, decreased vulnerability to economic shocks and natural disasters, and better governance. Since the 1970s, the United Nations has identified LDCs as states which, for reasons of very low income, poor human development, and high economic vulnerability, face more structural handicaps than other countries in rising out of poverty. But the increased focus on LDCs’ challenges has not been matched by solutions. In the three decades since the first UNLDC conference in 1981, the number of LDCs has almost doubled from 25 to 48. Only three countries have graduated from LDC status: Botswana, Cap Verde and the Maldives. Despite substantial progress in recent years as compared to the 1990s, with more growth and exports, and fewer macroeconomic imbalances, LDCs remain home to more than 800 million people, and represent the poorest and weakest segment of the international community. The Istanbul Plan of Action sets out specific objectives: 7 percent annual growth, driven by strengthened productive and human capacities, reduced vulnerability, increased financial aid, and better governance.

Cheikh Sidi Diarra, the UN High Representative for the LDCs, says that the picture for LDC graduation is looking better. He foresees Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu passing the threshold in the coming years, along with Equatorial Guinea, Angola and East Timor, Nepal and Bangladesh.

Participants agreed that the development strategy adopted at the last UNLDC conference, in Brussels in 2001, had not been fully achieved. Known as the the Brussels Plan of Action (BPoA), that strategy focused mainly on social, human and environmental issues. In contrast, the Istanbul Plan of Action (IPoA) emphasises the strengthening of productive capacities in agriculture, manufacturing and services to allow LDCs to integrate effectively into global trade markets. “It is the best way to achieve sustained growth in LDCs” said Cheick Sidi Diarra, referring productive capacities.

The Istanbul plan calls on LDCs to assume the responsibility for their own development, and stresses the role of the state in stimulating the private sector for the purposes of “[...] generating employment and investment and enabling high, sustained and inclusive economic growth [...].” At the opening ceremony of the Istanbul summit, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called the “enthusiastic engagement” of the business community “one of the most significant aspects of this conference.” Some civil society groups, however, disapproved of the summit’s focus on the private sector, viewing it as a pretext for developed countries to shirk their responsibilities on providing additional aid.

With regards to agriculture, the text calls for fulfilling the pledge made by governments during the WTO’s Doha Round negotiations to ensure the elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies, which are especially trade-distorting. To that end, Stephen O’Brien, the UK minister of international development, called for a successful conclusion to the Doha Round, stressing that the conference must send a strong signal that the opportunity to reach an accord in the long-struggling talks could not be missed. He also urged all members of the Group of 20 leading developed and developing economies to extend duty-free, quota-free (DFQF) market access to all LDC exports, without any exceptions.

Trade proved to be the most controversial issue of the negotiations. The final plan of action calls only for a “timely implementation of duty and quota free market access, on a lasting basis for all LDCs” in line with the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, and “the abolition or reduction of arbitrary or unjustified trade barriers.”

The EU, along with Canada, Australia and New Zealand (collectively dubbed CANZ) expressed support for giving LDCs unrestricted market access (as they already do for most products), and urged all countries to do so. Prior to the conference, there had been hopes that the US and Japan, both of which still maintain significant trade barriers on exports from many LDCs, would announce new concessions under their respective Generalised System of Preference (GSP) schemes for LDCs. But no such promises were made by the two industrialised countries during the talks in Istanbul. In general, developing countries did not make any concrete proposals to advance the WTO Hong Kong decision of 2005 on on market access for LDC exports, which mandated all developed countries, and “developing-country members declaring themselves in a position to do so” to grant DFQF access to LDC products covering at least 97 percent of all tariff lines. LDCs argue that the 3 percent exception is enough to cover the limited handful of tariff lines in which they are internationally competitive, rendering the 97% DFQF scheme useless.

The plan of action’s section dealing with preferential treatment for LDC services exports - provisions that had been eagerly awaited by LDCs, particularly with regard to ‘Mode 4′, which covers temporary cross-border movement by workers - was struck from the draft for want of consensus: the EU, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the US refused. One source close to the negotiations said the issue had been controversial throughout the negotiations, since tradable services are important to LDCs, in particular to small island LDCs that have a limited capacity for merchandise production.

The final text, like earlier drafts, did not reflect the request made by LDCs for increased and predictable Aid for Trade funding, despite the potential for such assistance to increase exports and diversification.

Another source of dissatisfaction for the LDC group are the unchanged provisions on rules of origin, despite their push to obtain preferential, simplified rules of origin that would have enabled their products to qualify more easily for access to key markets.

On technology transfer to LDCs - which is mandatory under Article 66.2 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) - the US refused any form of binding commitment. The text therefore remains vague, only calling for development partners to provide enterprises with incentives to encourage technology transfer.

The low level of LDCs’ exports as a percentage of international trade - a mere 1 percent of world trade - and their relatively undiversified export baskets were echoed by many speakers during the conference. “Aid can alleviate poverty but only trade can allow LDCs leave poverty behind” said Peter Lilley, a UK member of parliament, during one of the high level debate organized during the conference.

In terms of climate change, there was no new progress in Istanbul on mobilising finances for climate change adaptation. Nor did the plan of action feature any mention of commitments from developed countries to undertake greenhouse gas emissions cuts. LDCs are asked to “mainstream and implement national adaption programmes of action [...] and national mitigation actions, and integrate these into national plans.”

Turning to development assistance, the plan articulates different modalities according to donors’ existing aid levels: donor countries providing more than 0.20 percent of their GNP as Official Development Assistance (ODA) to LDCs will “continue to do so”; and donors which have met an earlier 0.15 percent target will “undertake to reach 0.20 per cent expeditiously.” All other donor countries that have committed themselves to the 0.15 percent target undertook to try to achieve the target by 2015. Developed countries highlighted the need for better governance and accountability for the use of the funds allocated to LDCs, resulting in a section requiring LDCs to enhance “aid transparency and combat corruption.”

An additional respect in which the Istanbul Plan of Action differed substantially from the Brussels plan of ten years before was its emphasis on the importance of South-South cooperation. The text specifies that “South-South cooperation is not a substitute to North-South cooperation”, but that support from developing countries to LDCs should play a “complementary role in the implementation of the plan”. About $9.6 billion in ODA was granted through South-South cooperation in 2008, according to the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

According to Debapriya Bhattacharya, Bangladesh’s former ambassador to the WTO and a distinguished fellow at the Centre for Policy Dialogue in Dhaka, the Istanbul strategy replicated one of the chief failings of the Brussels plan by failing to include improved mechanisms for implementation and monitoring. “What is lacking is some serious political will to support the targets set in the Istanbul Plan,” he said.

Representatives of several civil society organisations expressed frustration during the closing ceremony, stating that the plan of action has been “undermined by the developed countries systematically having removed any targets, timetables and delivery mechanisms that may have been used to hold them to account.”

UNLDC IV brought together more than 7000 participants including government delegates, UN officials and representatives from other international organisations and NGOs. A comprehensive mid-term review is scheduled for 2015 in Istanbul.

ISTANBUL, TURKEY - This morning the UN conference on Least Developed Countries (LDCs) began in Istanbul to measure the progress of implementing a 10-year development strategy known as the Brussels Programme of Action and identify new strategies for continued sustainable development for the next decade.

“It is time to change our mindset,” said UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon in his opening remark. “Instead of seeing LDCs as the poor and weak (…), these 48 countries have a vast reservoir of untouched potential.”  He called for additional Official Development Assistance (ODA) to LDCs mentioning that despite the fact that ODA assistance has tripled in the past decade it is still insufficient. “Assistance to LDCs is not charity, it is a sound investment,” he added.

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso emphasised the importance of the private sector to LDC development and stated the commitment of the EU to LDCs. With EU aid to LDCs reaching € 53.8 billion in 2010, an increase of 4.5 percent over 2009, the bloc EU is the largest donor to the LDCs:

Jhala Nath Khanal, prime minister of Nepal and LDC chair, also said that the Brussels Programme of Action (BPoA) - which contains 30 international development goals - is still an “unfinished agenda.” The chair added that being at the centre of productive capacities the private sector should play a crucial role.

WTO Director Lamy in a short intervention said that the LDCs leaders should seize the opportunity of this conference in Istanbul to address a clear message to the negotiators of the Doha Round so as to unblock the recent deadlocks in favour of the LDCs. The duty-free, quota free (DFQF) scheme for LDC access to developed markets as well as the rules of origins can be improved, he said.

According to Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, the World Bank’s managing director, LDCs need to rebuild their fiscal space by strengthening their domestic revenues through higher tax levels. There is a high correlation between agriculture and private sector development, she explained, saying “essentially agriculture is a private sector activity”. The World Bank identified challenges in dealing with the private sector but also with a “youth budge” and reminded that education is critical and needs to be adequately linked to industries.

An Istanbul Program of Action will be approved at the end of the conference. The establishment of effective monitoring mechanisms is part of the success of the implementation of such a plan, said Turkey s President Gül, who suggested a mid-term review conference to be hosted in Istanbul in 2015.

The LDC-IV is currently  taking place in Istanbul on May 9-13.

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MEXICO CITY, MEXICO - The Transitional Committee (TC) for the design of the Green Climate Fund proved to succeed on Day 2 by establishing its general working arrangement and work plan. Four are the workstreams by which the TC will divide its task: I) scope, guiding principles, and cross-cutting issues; II) governance and institutional arrangements; III) operational modalities; IV) monitoring and evaluation. Representatives of Spain and Barbados, Switzerland and Democratic Republic of Congo, Australia and Pakistan, and Sweden and Bangladesh will serve as facilitators for each of those work streams respectively.

The TC also discussed the nature and functions of the Technical Support Unit. The Secretariat informed that various regional development banks as well as international institutions have responded to the UNFCCC call to serve as members of this technical group. Some TC Members expressed concern about the need to establish clear rules in order to avoid conflict of interest in the TSU work.

Regarding its work plan, the TC agreed to have two technical workshops, starting in Bonn next June, and three additional substantive meetings before Durban. Japan offered to host the second meeting of the TC, which is expected to take place next July.

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MEXICO CITY, MEXICO - In Cancun, Mexico last December, countries attending the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) for the UN Climate Convention agreed to create a Green Climate Fund (GCF). At the same time, they agreed to establish a Transitional Committee that will design the GCF.

The first meeting of the Transitional Committee is currently underway here in Mexico City.  Instead of launching quickly into the agenda, the entire morning and most of the afternoon was dedicated to deciding who would chair the meeting. Finally, the Committee decided that Mexico, who currently holds the presidency of the COP, South Africa, who will take over the presidency this December, and Norway would all co-chair.   The Committee then spent an hour discussing an alternate agenda proposed by the African Group. The proposal was much more detailed than the draft agenda circulated by the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, who organised the meeting.  Finally, the group agreed to adjust the original agenda. The meeting was extended an hour until 20:00 in order to begin an exchange of views on the scope and purpose of the CGF.  Day two will continue this discussion.

According to the original agenda, the first meeting should have elected officers, adopted the agenda, and then decided on working arrangements for the Committee as well as a workplan.

Other questions, such as rules of procedure for the Fund (how developing countries will apply for funding, transparency mechanisms, as well as how to track sources and managing financial support provided by developed countries), financial instruments and models, and mechanisms to ensure environmental and social standards may be taken up at the Committee’s future meetings.  But at this pace, this year the Committee may only manage to agree on principles and guidelines for the Board to further develop the detailed rules after Durban.

The Green Climate Fund will support projects, programmes, policies and other activities relating to climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries through thematic funding windows.

Summary of Transitional Committee Terms of Reference

· Fund Board Rules of Procedure
· Legal and institutional arrangements
· Financial instruments, funding windows and access modalities
· Standards, safeguards and accountability
· Expert and technical advice mechanisms
· Independent performance evaluation
· Role of the UNFCCC Secretariat
· Complementarity with other funds and institutions
· Stakeholder input and participation

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