In response to this need, ICTSD has engaged in a bottom-up assessment of the strategies that individual developing countries have developed to enhance their ability to make use of WTO dispute settlement and to coordinate such activities among public and private stakeholders on a national level. The outcome is the form of nine country studies is now presented in the book Dispute Settlement at the WTO – The Developing Country Experience. Countries covered in the analysis include Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Egypt, South Africa and Kenya. The publication concludes with a comprehensive list of recommendations. For further information kindly consult our webpage at: http://ictsd.org/i/dsu/98179/.

Prof. Giovanni Anania from the University of Calabria in Italy, presented how these new trade deals with the EU could affect trade flows for specific banana exporting and importing countries around the world. Prof. Anania will shared his thoughts on this issue with Geneva-based negotiators that would like to understand better the implications of these accords and their relationship with the recently-signed multilateral deal.

ICTSD hopes that this event will help to provide policy-makers, negotiators and other stakeholders with a clear and accurate assessment of the likely implications of various trade policy options.

Os calendários de 2010 e 2011 serão marcados pela emergência de novos líderes em sete dos dez países que compõem os principais projetos de integração na América do Sul. Chile, Colômbia e Uruguai elegeram recentemente seus novos presidentes, e a escolha do novo mandatário brasileiro será conhecida em finais deste ano. Em 2011, Argentina e Peru terão eleições presidenciais. O agitado calendário eleitoral nesse biênio reacende o debate acerca dos possíveis impactos da emergência de novas lideranças políticas na região sobre as negociações de comércio internacional. Mais do que isso, as recentes alterações no mapa da integração sul-americana chamam a atenção para as perspectivas dos principais blocos regionais da América do Sul no contexto das eleições presidenciais.

Em muitos dos países dessa região, a temática da integração tem ocupado posição de destaque nas estratégias de governo dos candidatos. Por exemplo, no Brasil, o Mercado Comum do Cone Sul (Mercosul) constituiu recentemente objeto de debates entre os dois principais candidatos à corrida presidencial.

O presidente recentemente eleito no Uruguai, José Mujica destacou, em seu discurso de posse, a importância do Mercosul para o país, ao mesmo tempo em que exigiu maior reciprocidade dos países membros do bloco. Mais precisamente, a ênfase do mandatário uruguaio tem sido a redução de assimetrias entre os integrantes do Mercosul.

Como candidato nas eleições no Chile, Sebastián Piñera assegurou que direcionaria atenção ao estreitamento dos laços do país com a América do Sul e a Ásia. O novo mandatário criticou, entretanto, a carência de um objetivo claro nas iniciativas de integração em andamento na América do Sul.

A análise das perspectivas para a integração na América do Sul passa necessariamente pela identificação de padrões nas negociações comerciais dos países da região. A partir desses elementos, é possível observar mudanças na trajetória de determinado país em matéria comercial. Cabe destacar, contudo, que a relação dessas alterações com a eleição de um novo mandatário deve ser analisada com a devida ponderação, haja vista a miríade de fatores envolvidos nas escolhas de políticas comerciais.

Padrões de negociação comercial na América do Sul

Diante da diversidade de experiências de integração na América do Sul, uma forma de definir padrões de atuação na esfera comercial envolve refletir sobre o nível de desenvolvimento dos parceiros que o país tem buscado - se países desenvolvidos (PD) ou em desenvolvimento (PED) -, bem como no foco geográfico da busca por parcerias comerciais - intra ou extrarregional.

Colômbia e Peru, por exemplo, são países que há tempos buscam uma aproximação com os Estados Unidos da América (EUA). O Peru assinou acordos de livre comércio com Canadá, China, Cingapura, Tailândia, além dos EUA. Destes, todos tiveram suas negociações iniciadas durante a gestão de Alan García, à exceção daqueles celebrados com a Tailândia e os EUA, cujas tratativas começaram, respectivamente, em 2002 e 2004. Cabe destacar, ainda, que o atual presidente peruano deu início à negociação de acordos de livre comércio com Coreia do Sul, Japão e México, bem como de um acordo Transpacífico. É notória, portanto, a atenção deste país às relações bilaterais com os EUA e extrarregionais, com especial ênfase na Ásia.

Ao longo do mandato de Álvaro Uribe, a Colômbia negociou um acordo de livre comércio envolvendo El Salvador, Guatemala e Honduras, em vigor desde 2009, além de iniciar diálogos com Coreia do Sul (2009) e Panamá (2010). Essa gestão também tratou de dar andamento à vigência do acordo com o Chile. Na Colômbia, é possível identificar uma alteração substancial na condução da política comercial após meados da década de 1990, quando o país deixou de empreender esforços para a consecução de arranjos deste tipo na América do Sul e passou a privilegiar o aprofundamento dos laços com América Central, Ásia e EUA.

Tais opções extrarregionais foram buscadas isoladamente por tais países muito em parte devido ao fracasso da integração andina. As divergências políticas entre os membros da Comunidade Andina de Nações (CAN) forçaram a marginalização do projeto, a qual foi agravada em 2006, com a retirada da Venezuela e as constantes ameaças de deserção por parte de Bolívia e Equador. Os motivos para essa ruptura estão diretamente relacionados aos países e blocos com os quais alguns membros da CAN decidiram negociar.

O alinhamento estreito entre Colômbia e EUA constituiu o principal argumento de Hugo Chávez para justificar a retirada da Venezuela do bloco andino. Para o presidente venezuelano, a influência dos EUA na região era demasiada. O mandatário não se referia apenas à opção da Colômbia, mas também do Peru, pela negociação do tratado de livre comércio com a potência norte-americana.

Ademais, Bolívia e Equador mostraram insatisfação com relação ao curso tomado pelas tratativas do acordo bilateral envolvendo a CAN e a União Europeia (UE), iniciadas em 2007. Os dois países optaram pelo abandono das negociações devido às profundas divergências entre as Partes andinas em matéria de propriedade intelectual, proteção da biodiversidade e tarifas sobre a banana. Com isso, seguiu-se a adoção de um novo modelo de diálogos fundado na adaptação às necessidades de cada Parte. Sob esta nova dinâmica, Colômbia e Peru finalizaram as negociações antes dos demais membros, em março de 2010.

Se considerarmos que as próximas eleições na Bolívia, no Equador e na Venezuela estão distantes, é difícil imaginar que o panorama comercial observado na região andina seja significativamente modificado. Isso porque a vitória recente de Juan Manuel Santos na Colômbia, candidato apoiado por Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), aponta para a continuidade da preferência pelo alinhamento aos EUA.

No Peru, os baixos índices de aprovação do atual presidente Alan García tornam provável o surgimento de novas propostas políticas e econômicas nas campanhas eleitorais de 2011, inclusive na esfera comercial. Contudo, na trajetória política peruana, insatisfações de ordem econômica e social conduziram à alteração do partido governante, mas não da política comercial do país.

Um outro padrão de associação comercial observado entre os países sul-americanos tem nos PEDs os principais interlocutores das negociações. O grupo que inclui Bolívia, Equador e Venezuela tem buscado uma forma diferenciada de integração, na medida em que articula uma agenda pautada primordialmente na coordenação política e social entre os países membros, como nos casos da Aliança Bolivariana para os Povos de Nossa América (Alba) e da União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Unasul). Cabe destacar que os governos de Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales e Rafael Correa representaram pontos de inflexão na condução da política comercial de seus países, sendo a mudança mais significativa a ruptura das relações amistosas com os EUA.

Argentina, Brasil, Paraguai e Uruguai também têm privilegiado associações comerciais envolvendo PEDs. Embora as negociações com a UE possam ser consideradas um desvio em relação a essa tendência geral, as perspectivas para um acordo entre os dois blocos não parecem positivas à luz dos recentes desdobramentos. Na última rodada de negociações, a delegação europeia criticou a imposição, pela Argentina, de barreiras comerciais a produtos agrícolas da UE. Mais do que colocar em questão o curso das tratativas com o bloco europeu, tais práticas protecionistas desafiam a coesão interna do Mercosul.

Desde a sua criação, este bloco constitui o principal sujeito das negociações de comércio internacional envolvendo os países membros. De modo geral - e principalmente no contexto mais recente -, o Mercosul tem buscado aprofundar as relações com o eixo Sul-Sul, bem como os países da CAN. Em ambas as frentes, os resultados foram pouco expressivos: no eixo Sul-Sul, foi celebrado apenas um acordo, com Israel (2010); e, no que toca aos diálogos junto à CAN, a fragilidade desta dificultou a observação de avanços significativos.

O principal desafio do Mercosul parece residir no âmbito interno. As críticas à estrutura decisória do bloco e à falta de prioridade ao objetivo de reduzir assimetrias já constituíam o foco das críticas das lideranças no Paraguai e Uruguai desde início dos anos 2000. Estas objeções foram acentuadas com a eleição de Fernando Lugo (2008-atual) no Paraguai e de Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010) no Uruguai. A ascensão de José Mujica à Presidência uruguaia veio acentuar tais demandas.

De outro lado, a relação comercial entre os dois principais sócios do Mercosul encontra-se desgastada desde a crise econômica de 2008, contexto em que a Argentina suspendeu licenças automáticas às importações brasileiras. Como resultado disso, no primeiro semestre de 2009, as exportações brasileiras à Argentina sofreram queda de 43%. As medidas adotadas pelo Brasil em retaliação afetaram 9% das exportações argentinas, prejudicando a entrada de produtos como frutas, alho, vinho, queijo, cosméticos e farinha de trigo.

Esse quadro tem sido alvo de críticas no setor privado brasileiro. Para o diretor de comércio exterior da Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp), Roberto Fonseca, o Brasil deveria abandonar a estratégia de negociação em bloco, “dar um passo atrás e reinventar o Mercosul como área de livre comércio”.

A proposta do setor privado é apoiada pelo candidato José Serra, do Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), que recentemente defendeu a flexibilização do Mercosul. Para Serra, o bloco deveria ter sido anteriormente fortalecido como área de livre comércio, para que então se tornasse uma união aduaneira. Diferentemente, a principal opositora, Dilma Rousseff, do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), acredita no fortalecimento do Mercosul como alternativa às dificuldades enfrentadas pelo bloco. A depender dos resultados nas eleições do Brasil, a temática do Mercosul poderá entrar com maior força na campanha eleitoral argentina.

Quanto ao Chile, apesar de sublinhar a integração com a América do Sul como uma de suas prioridades, o novo mandatário Sebastián Piñera encontrará dificuldades de ordem política para empreender um aprofundamento das relações do Chile com a região. Tendo em vista a orientação à direita de seu governo, o alinhamento com países como Equador, Bolívia e Venezuela parece pouco provável. No âmbito do Mercosul, essa dificuldade persiste, na medida em que avança o processo de adesão da Venezuela ao bloco. Assim, o aprofundamento das relações com a Ásia - outra região que se encontra entre as prioridades da gestão Piñera - será, possivelmente, favorecido nesse contexto. Um primeiro sinal disso foi a recente conclusão das negociações de um tratado de livre comércio entre o país sul-americano e a Malásia. Ao ser ratificado, este tratado será somado aos demais que o Chile já possui com países asiáticos - China, Coreia do Sul e Japão.

Dessa forma, a atual gestão pode representar um afastamento em relação ao Cone Sul - ou mesmo à região como um todo -, uma vez que sua antecessora, Michelle Bachelet, privilegiara o retorno ao que acreditava ser a “vocação latino-americana” do Chile.

Considerações finais

A análise dos padrões gerais de negociação dos países sul-americanos revela a predominância de uma tendência centrífuga de associação comercial: alguns países voltados aos EUA, uns mais enfáticos ao aprofundamento das relações com a Ásia e outros que defendem arranjos com PEDs da própria região. O único projeto de integração comum a todos os países sul-americanos é a Unasul, a qual, entretanto, não se pauta nas relações comerciais.

Assim, embora conste nas campanhas presidenciais de parcela significativa dos países da região, a integração na América do Sul parece representar mais um elemento retórico. Mesmo nos países vinculados a blocos subregionais, é possível questionar o alinhamento de seus Estados membros, como no caso da CAN e do Mercosul.

É preciso ressaltar que esse quadro não resulta unicamente de escolhas realizadas nas eleições. Em alguns casos, como Colômbia, Peru e Uruguai, a emergência de novas lideranças significou mais uma mudança em termos de intensidade do que de orientação da política comercial. Em outros países a alteração desta mostrou-se mais significativa, como nas experiências de Bolívia, Equador, Paraguai e Venezuela.

De todo modo, a crescente visibilidade adquirida por temas de política externa nas agendas eleitorais incrementará o debate em torno dessas temáticas. Entretanto, a distância entre a retórica da agenda e a prática política na região deixa em suspenso as expectativas por alterações substanciais em um contexto próximo. Se não significar a revisão, no curto prazo, da tendência centrífuga na integração sul-americana, que a maior visibilidade desta realidade contribua, ao menos, para o amadurecimento do debate em torno de propostas nesse sentido.

O acordo com a Tailândia entrou em vigor em 2005. Já aquele com os EUA passou a vigorar somente a partir de 2009. Ver: <http://www.mincetur.gob.pe/newweb/Default.aspx?tabid=127>.

Um exemplo emblemático desse período constitui o acordo de livre comércio assinado entre Colômbia, México e Venezuela, em 1994, em vigor desde 1995.

Em abril de 2010, registrou-se apenas 26% no nível de aprovação ao presidente peruano. Ver: <http://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/internacional/2010/04/05/lula-e-segundo-governante-mais-bem-avaliado-do-continente-diz-levantamento.jhtm>. Cabe destacar, de todo modo, que a Constituição peruana permite que um candidato seja eleito mais de uma vez ao cargo presidencial, mas proíbe a reeleição imediata.

Fisheries trade relations between the EU and ACP countries are governed by World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions, as well as those of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the EU and ACP countries. These relations are undergoing a period of change, with the negotiation of new economic partnership agreements (EPAs) that will replace current unilateral trade preferences offered by the EU with reciprocal preferences. The ACP-EU EPA negotiations have given rise to concerns about potential loss of preferences that could result in a significant decrease of export revenues for ACP countries. Other issues of concern for ACP countries relate to tariff escalation and tariff peaks, reforming rules of origin, and the implications of EU regulations on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. The inclusion of investment in the negotiations brings a new dimension that warrants careful consideration.

The continuation of uninterrupted market access for fish and fish products was a primary motivation for several ACP countries to agree to initial interim economic partnership agreements (IEPAs) or to agree to full EPAs with the European Community at the end of 2007. In certain cases a specific fisheries chapter was included in a regional IEPA/EPA. This was the case for the East African Community (EAC) and Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) IEPAs, and similarly for the chapter on agriculture and fisheries in the Caribbean EPA (CARIFORUM). In other cases, fisheries were part of bilateral IEPAs between the EU and certain non-least developed countries (LDCs) in the ACP. This was the case for Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, as West Africa did not come to an agreement with the European Community on a regional EPA at the end of December 2007.

The process of negotiating EPAs, including negotiations on rules governing trade and market access for fish and fish products, has been complex, challenging and divisive for the ACP groupings. At present, ACP groups yet to finalize their negotiations with the European Community are under pressure to do so. In regions that have already initialled an interim agreement, a number of questions subject to possible renegotiations remain. Overall, there is an urgent need for regions with IEPAs to ensure satisfaction with fisheries provisions already negotiated, and for regions without interim EPAs to learn from others in order to better articulate their positions in the process of negotiating full EPAs.

In response to these concerns, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) is initiating a process of analytical review of negotiations on fisheries under the EPA negotiations. This effort seeks to provide a better understanding of the substance of the provisions contained in IEPA/EPA agreements and to assess their significance from a trade, livelihood and sustainable development perspective.

As part of this process, this study is intended to be a practical tool for national and regional policymakers and stakeholders. It is meant to contribute to enhancing preparedness for negotiations of full EPAs such that the outcome contributes effectively to improving livelihoods and food security, ensuring meaningful market access, and achieving broad sustainable development objectives in ACP countries.

Liam Campling is currently a PhD candidate in development studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His research examines the global commodity chains in canned tuna (centred on the EU and US), with a focus on their developmental relationship with Fiji and Seychelles.

He has published on development in small island states, the politics of international trade relations and commodity studies in the Journal of Developing Societies, the Journal of Agrarian Change (with Henry Bernstein), Sustainable Development (with Michel Rosalie), Island Studies Journal (with Elizabeth Havice) and Development Policy Review (with Jesper Nielson and Stefano Ponte). He is on the editorial board of the journal Historical Materialism and is reviews editor of the Journal of Agrarian Change. Since November 2007 he has been consultant trade policy analyst to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA). He has also worked as a consultant for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Center for the Development of Enterprise (CDE), the governments of Mauritius and Seychelles, the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, the Regional Trade Facilitation Programme and United Nations Research Insitute for Social Development (UNRISD). He previously taught international politics and history on the University of Manchester Twinning Programme, Seychelles Polytechnic.

This paper is part of ICTSD’s project on fisheries, trade and sustainable development, which aims to foster an inclusive and informed process for crafting multilateral, regional and domestic trade rules and policies in the fisheries sector that are supportive of sustainable development.

The provisions of the European Commission-CARIFORUM (Caribbean) EPA on IP rights should be examined in light of the factors necessary for institutional and economic development of ACP countries. With change in industrial competitive structure based on innovation, technology and knowledge, the advanced nations are aggressively pushing for better protection of their intellectual assets through IP rights. The EPA negotiation experience shows us the different approach taken by developing countries. The African and Pacific countries did not concede to European demands on IP rights protection and instead accepted an agreement covering only goods in order to ensure consistency with the WTO rules.2 So the question is: did the Caribbean secure any advantage by agreeing to European demands on IP rights protection, and if so, what is the way forward for other regions? There are various issues that may arise from the IP rights under the EPA, including the balance in concessions, the long term advantages or disadvantages for Europeans promoting narrow and short-sighted interests in EPAs and the necessary response to address development challenges in IP rights.

Balance in concessions

The EPA agreements introduce binding TRIPS-plus standards on the Caribbean with non-binding commitments for cooperation in innovation, technology transfer and cultural industry development.3 Whether the Caribbean will benefit from the provisions for cooperation in innovation and technology transfer depends on further implementation arrangements and funding from the Europeans. However, if the European Commission fails in its commitment to cooperate on innovation, such failure will not be the basis for the Caribbean countries to derogate, withdraw, or change their commitment with respect to IP rights protection.

The Caribbean signatories would have to implement their obligations by January 2014, unless a new period is agreed jointly which takes into account different priorities and levels of development. This transition period, which is beyond 2021 for Haiti, is the European Commission’s only significant concession to Caribbean countries.4 Under the TRIPS Agreement, by the end of the transition period, the Caribbean nations have to extend the same level of protection that they conceded to the EU to all WTO members. This includes the extension of the standards of protection under the WIPO internet treaties. The TRIPS-plus effect of the EPA is abundantly clear: when WTO members enter into an agreement on IP rights, they usually move beyond the TRIPS standard. The European Commission secured major concessions from the Caribbean nations by expanding the protection of geographical indications (GIs) - a category of IP rights that Europeans are successfully using to target sophisticated consumers with their agricultural products, beverages, wines and spirits. The European Commission also secured Caribbean commitment to the WIPO internet and IP administration treaties, protection of industrial design, trademarks  and enhanced the standard for enforcement of IP rights in the Caribbean region.

The Caribbean negotiators attempted to balance respective national interests in the EPA IP provisions. However, their interest in cultural industries and the protection of Caribbean GIs hardly benefited from the final result of the IP rights in the EPA. WTO panels have already confirmed access to European registration and protection of GIs to all WTO members.5 Caribbean countries do not receive any additional advantages by agreeing to the extension of GIs to all products. Instead they lose a bargaining tool in the WTO negotiations. Moreover, the provisions of the EPA on traditional knowledge and genetic resources do not resolve any global legal questions but lock the Caribbean countries into a consultation mechanism with the European Commission in international negotiations.

Perhaps the most innovative aspect of the CARIFORUM EPA relates to the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation that aims at implementing the UNESCO Convention on Artistic and Cultural Expression.6 Much of the protocol’s best endeavor provisions on movement of artists, technical assistance, co-production and publishing would only take effect through subsequent arrangements for cooperation and implementation. Thus, the advantage for Caribbean nations from the provisions on GIs and cultural cooperation lies in establishing the basis for further collaboration.

The EPA provisions do not impact current EU trade policies and rules that could affect the trade interest of the ACP countries. Even the negotiations at the WTO hardly indicate if the European agricultural policy is to be changed beyond the minimal reform plan within the EU itself. The patent system that can be used to misappropriate genetic resources and traditional knowledge, the plant variety protection that threatens food security during high food prices and other EU laws and practices remain unchallenged under the EPAs.

Fixing national policy orientation and institutions for development

The international debate on EPAs and IP rights protection has focused too much, although for the right reasons, on the unfair exercise of political and economic leverage of rich countries against poor ones.  Beyond the discourse on power relations, the responsibility of governments for national policies of development needs a fresh look, especially as the Caribbean countries proceed to implementing the IP section of the EPA by 2014.  The backbone of development institutions is the laws and the national policy orientation towards local economic actors. The UN Commission on legal empowerment of the poor identified that the prosperity of rich countries is created through a variety of instruments and norms such as, tradable assets and IP rights that rely on an effective legal framework and functioning institutions.  Bringing the institutions of the rich countries, such as higher standards of IP rights protection, to small economies would mean at least two things: (1) detaching foreign trade policy from local economy, and (2) undermining local potentials in favour of commercial interests of rich nations.

When implementing EPA commitments the Caribbean nations need to consider how to respond to these challenges through (i) counter measures that minimise the potential costs of the EPA; (ii) proactive measures empowering the local economic actors and (iii) development benchmarks that function as a basis for implementing the EPA provisions on IP rights. In this regard, the Caribbean nations need to prevent the tightening of local markets for knowledge goods due to higher standards of IP rights. This can be done through ensuring stronger patentability criteria, introducing effective and robust limitations and exceptions to IP rights and regulation of licensing and anti-competitive behavior. At the same time the Caribbean nations need to invest in institutions that will encourage local innovation and empowerment. The protection and use of traditional knowledge, the development of an IP property system that is closely linked to the local economy (such as utility models), creating collective trademarks, protection of cultural expressions and branding of local products should be the ultimate aim of Caribbean countries.  On the whole, developing nations lag behind in global research, development expenditure and the patenting trend. While catching up with advanced nations could be a novel ambition, poorer countries need to look at the potential and IP rights that are appropriate to their economies. Finally, since the Caribbean nations have the option to request an extension to the implementation period, they need to use progress in protecting and promoting Caribbean GIs, cultural industry, use of the utility model, licensing and technology transfer, and most importantly, the implementation of the provisions for cooperation on innovation, as benchmarks for full implementation. 

Lessons for African and Pacific countries

The recent study by CIEL shows that IP rights remain on the agenda for African and Pacific countries following the conclusion of the ‘goods only’ interim EPA.7  It recommends that ACP countries try to identify offensive interests in IP rights such as genetic resources and traditional knowledge, as well as defensive interests such as countering higher standards of IP rights. However, it is proposed that the best strategy would be not to negotiate IP rights under EPAs at all. The lesson from the CARIFORUM EPA is clear: negotiation of IP rights does not bring a balanced outcome due to the sharp contrast in economic interests and institutional factors necessary to improve national competitiveness in a globalised world. The CARIFORUM EPA demonstrates the risks for African and Pacific regions of opening up negotiations on IP rights, with the hope of getting concessions on traditional knowledge, public health and genetic resources. The European Commission would not be able to offer any concessions for the offensive agendas of the African region, since that would require revisiting European laws.

Ultimately the prospect of development for ACP countries rests upon their own ability to upgrade local capabilities and empower local actors in the global economy. The EPAs undermine what is called ‘policy space‘ for economic development. However, it is not necessarily true that other ACP countries that have not signed an EPA with IP rights are using existing regulatory spaces, such as the transition period for implementation of the TRIPS Agreement for LDCs and the flexibility to promote public interest in the regulation of IP rights. Requests at the WTO for technical assistance to implement the TRIPS Agreement and recent interest in implementing higher standards of IP rights enforcement in the World Customs Organisation are examples of incoherent national policy orientation by some ACP countries. If African and Pacific countries are effectively able to reject European demands for higher IP rights standards in the EPA, but do not use the advantage of existing regulatory space, the discourse on power relationships and the problem of IP rights in economic development would be superficial.

Concluding remarks

The EPA negotiations on IP rights raise fundamental questions for development, not merely due to the TRIPS-plus nature of the commitments under the CARIFORUM EPA, but because the negotiations are an indication of how countries could harmonise their national priorities and relevant institutions in their foreign trade policy. There are no indications that the EU would negotiate its own policies that affect the socio-economic interests of ACP countries in negotiations related to IP rights. The European Commission aims to introduce institutions with higher IP rights standards that serve its industries and negotiation challenges at the WTO. ACP countries need to focus on the right domestic institutions and laws in order to improve learning, upgrade technological capability and ensure access to knowledge in the process of economic and human development.

1  Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng is Programme Officer for the Innovation and Access to Knowledge Programme at the South Centre in Geneva.

2  For further analysis of the status of IP negotiations of ACP countries with the European Commission, see CIEL (2008), Intellectual Property in European Union Economic Partnership Agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries: What way forward after the Cariforum EPA and the interim EPAs? www.ciel.org

3  Trade and innovation in the EPAs: another step towards re-framing TRIPS, Malcolm Spence, Trade Negotiations Insights, Volume 7. Number 5 / June 2008, p.6. TRIPS is the World Trade Organisation Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement.

4    Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM states, on the one part, and the European Community and its member states, on the other part.

5    WTO (2005), European Commission - Trademarks and Geographical Indications, Reports of the panels on complaints by the United States (WT/DS174) and Australia (WT/DS290).

6    United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (2005).

7    See endnote 2.

The signing of a full and final EPA assumes that the legitimate interests of both parties have been taken into account. However, political decision-makers in Central Africa have been pressured into signing this agreement before major differences have been resolved, namely over how the partnership will be financed, the rate and time-scale of trade liberalisation, the inclusion of the Most Favoured Nation clause and rules of origin in the text of
the Agreement.
 
The problem of financing the partnership, or the development dimension, is all the more crucial given that implementing the EPA will involve structural adjustments to the economies of the Central African States and consequent loss of tax and customs revenues.4 Logically, there is a need to reinforce basic infrastructures (to reduce the cost of production) and to improve the efficiency of internal tax collection instruments. Given these constraints, the Europeans argue that the costs of implementing the EPA should be met by the European Development Fund (EDF) through the National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPs). Now, it is not difficult to see that the EDF is not the appropriate channel for financing the fallout from the EPA. The type of partnership being negotiated has the peculiar feature of granting reciprocal trade preferences which would entail major adjustment costs for Central Africa. Since these costs derive from the dismantling of trade barriers under the EPA, the modalities of financing such costs should be negotiated under the same heading as market access issues. Or, better still, once the amount of the RIP has been unilaterally fixed by the European Commission and has no link to the costs of implementing the EPA, some proportionality should be established between the losses incurred and the amount allocated by the EU.
 
Following this line of thought, it should be borne in mind that Central Africa’s dismantling of tariff barriers will make small and medium sized enterprises vulnerable, as they will face increased competition from products imported from Europe. The closing down of businesses and the knock-on social problems call for reinforcement of basic infrastructures and improvement in competitiveness. If indeed the EPA is a new partnership involving reciprocal opening-up and fair compensation for any ensuing losses, there is a need to make the reinforcement of basic infrastructure one of the priority areas for funding earmarked under the EPA Regional Fund and to ensure that the dismantling of tariff barriers will actually lead to lower market prices of goods for consumers.
 
We live in hope, as the saying goes, that the political representatives of Central Africa will remember that on July 16 2007 at Yaoundé, the Joint Central African Ministerial Committee and the European Commissioners for Trade and Development agreed, in relation to the sale of goods, that:
 
“Central Africa will provide an initial list in September of products to be removed from tariff protection covering 60% of imports originating in the European Community, as well as the list of remaining  products. In relation to this list of remaining products, and with a view to establishing the coverage ratios and the timescale for the dismantling of tariff barriers contained  in the Central African States’s final offer, the Ministerial Committee is agreed on developing a plan for tariff liberalisation which focuses on  development, and therefore sets out the following targets: (i) for extremely sensitive products on this list, and for any future sensitive products put forward as candidates for liberalisation over the next 25 years, the European Commission and Central Africa undertake to study each  tariff  line on this list; (ii) the exact percentage of tariff dismantling will be determined after an examination of each tariff  line, in a way which encourages development, improvements in competitiveness and diversification of  sectors of production, economic growth, the fight against poverty, food security, consumer wellbeing and employment in Central Africa.”
 
As examples of persisting differences, we may cite the interpretation of GATT article XXIV relating to ‘substantially all trade’,5 rate of liberalisation,6 transition periods,7  liberalisation of at least 50% of the service sector and rules of origin. Actual examples of the latter show the scale of the problems that may arise if the negotiators do not keep their eyes on the ball.
 

The setbacks
 
According to the Cotonou Agreement, fish was considered to be an originating product if caught by ships on which 50% of the crew came from EU member states or from ACP/Overseas countries and territories.8 This guaranteed employment opportunities for citizens of ACP countries particularly on European Union tuna fishing vessels which would unload their catch in ACP countries to be processed before export to European markets. If the European Union had its way, European boat owners would be able to take on board a crew not originating in Central Africa but still benefit from the rules of origin - as if milk from a French cow which was imported and raised in Central Africa, subsequently produced French milk! The European Union wants to go even further and force Central Africa to accept that the opportunity to rent or charter boats must be first refused by European fishing interests.9 
 
The EU’s unilateral demands also involve the textile sector. In a departure from the Cotonou Agreement, which stipulated that articles made from imported fabric could not be considered as having originating status, the EU now demands that in certain cases: 
* The kind of yarn to be used in manufacture should no longer be specified10  
* The reference to change in tariff heading should be removed and the 50% price ex-works should be the only condition set11 
* Knitted and crocheted articles of apparel and clothing accessories (chap. 61) should be made directly from fabric rather than yarn, and articles of apparel and clothing accessories, other than knitted or crocheted (with the exception of  handkerchiefs, pouches, shawls, scarves, mantillas, etc.) should have originating status if they are made from fabric.
 
We should therefore realise that, in concrete terms, the ACP countries will no longer form a single territory and hence a so-called ‘cumulation’ zone. In fact, regional agreements turn the countries within the regional bloc into a single territory. ‘Cumulation’ will no longer be possible unless the countries form part of the same  zone, that is, the same trading area, unless the partners have the same rules of origin and are part of a legal framework which allows ‘cumulation’ and administrative cooperation. From this point of view, Cameroon will not be able to ‘cumulate’ with products originating in Nigeria until Central Africa and West Africa have the same rules of origin and engage in cooperation at the level of customs administration.
 
In a word, if Central African political leaders sign up to the rules of origin that the EU wants to impose on Central Africa, the industrialisation that is said to be necessary for growth and the fight against poverty will remain a distant dream.  When we see the difficulties faced by Mauritius in using Kenyan inputs in its exports to Europe, we can imagine the blow our region would suffer when the EU, for its part, has already managed to create safeguard mechanisms.
 
In fact, it is unreasonable to force Central Africa to open markets completely to products where manufacturers close their own markets by recourse to a range of mechanisms and subterfuges. If globalisation is to become reality, it must take into account that in these circumstances the region is in a better position to know what is right for its own countries and hence for its sub-regions.
 
1  Jacob Kotcho is the Permanent Secretary of the Citizens’ Association for the Defence of Collective Interests (ACDIC) and Martin Abega is the Executive Secretary of the Cameroon Joint Employers’ Group (GICAM). See www.acdic.net and www.legicam.org
2  The four major agricultural exports from the Central African region only make up 7.6% of total exports to the EU estimated at a value of €6,676,659, while crude oil and minerals represent 57.6% (source: comtext 2007 EU declarations).
3  To read the full article see: “Opinion: Food insecurity”, Peter Mandelson, The International Herald Tribune, May 22 2008, www.iht.com
4  Studies are to be carried out on how to calculate the matrix for net fiscal impact on the basis of the general calculable equilibrium model (for the EU) and the partial equilibrium model (for Central Africa).
5  The basis for calculating the ‘substantially all trade’ to be liberalised is not consensual: Central Africa understands this trade to consist of both imports and exports, whereas other WTO members believe  that such trade concerns only imports.
6  70/30 for Central Africa and 80/20 for the European Union.
7  25 years for Central Africa and 17 years for the European Union.
8  Article 3. (d) title 2.
9  We may well think that this is based on the lack of national capital in Central Africa for the direct acquisition of ships from the factory.
10 This specifically concerns coverings, bed linen, curtains, etc; other furnishing articles made from  felt and non-woven fabrics, fabrics made from non-natural, rather than natural, fibers. 
11 Embroidery in garment form, in strips or in patterns.

The EU cited the 25 May decision as an example of its good faith efforts to comply with the WTO ruling from September 2006, which found that European countries illegally hindered the trade of GM foods (see Bridges Trade BioRes, 6 October 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/biores/06-10-06/story1.htm). The panel ruled that several aspects of the EU’s approval process for GM products violated the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). Specifically, it ruled against the EU’s failure to approve a number of biotech products (referred to as ‘product-specific measures’), and against national-level bans in several EU member states on the marketing and import of specific biotech products that had already been approved at the EU-wide level. The ruling was based on a complaint brought in 2003 by the US, Argentina and Canada.

The announcement confirming that Austria has lifted its national level ban came long after the original November 27, 2007 deadline originally set for compliance. While Austria will allow the import and processing of GM corn, it will not allow it to be planted in Austria.

The decision comes as a victory for the European Commission (EC), as the Austrian government has long been among the most resistant toward GM crops. Austria banned the import and processing of MON810 in June 1999 and T25 in April 2000 because of concerns on the effect on non-target organisms and the risk of cut-crossing GM maize with wild relatives.

Forcing individual Member states to comply with EU WTO obligations on biotech foods is a difficult process. Efforts by the European Commission to force the repeal of Austrian safeguard measures through a draft decision have been rejected by EU ministers in the Environment Council (see Bridges Trade BioRes, 19 January 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/biores/07-01-19/inbrief.htm#4.

On a related note, the UK has renewed discussion on relaxing EU rules on GM animal feed imports, citing rising food prices. At a 19 June summit in Brussels, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown indicated the UK’s willingness to open its market to GM products after discussion with the Agricultural Biotechnology Council.

ICTSD reporting; “EU says Austria has lifted a ban on importing, processing genetically modified corn,” ASSOCIATED PRESS, 24 June 2008.

The standards include zero tolerance for child and slave labour, with the requirement that mills have 100 percent mechanised labour by 2014. The private-sector regulations are meant to ease European consumer concern about ethanol’s sustainability and its environmental, social and economic implications. The trading company SCA, which will manage the exports, says this represents a major step toward realising an international standard for sustainable ethanol.

Though there is discussion worldwide about certification criteria for sustainable ethanol, no decisions have been made yet (see Bridges Trade BioRes, 18 April 2008, http://www.ictsd.org/biores/08-04-18/story2.htm). Overall, the sustainability of the biofuels sector is increasingly being questioned, especially following the recent rapid rise in food prices (see related story, this issue, and Bridges Trade BioRes, 13 June 2008, http://www.ictsd.org/biores/08-06-13/story1.htm).

In related news, Brazilian president Lula da Silva has said that Brazil expects rapid expansion of its ethanol industry and is preparing to address growing concerns about its ethanol production. Lula met with US president George Bush in Washington following the early June Rome Summit on World Food Security. During the discussions, Bush said the US planned to raise its consumption from 5 billion to 35 billion gallons by 2017, using both domestic corn-based products and sugar-based imports from Brazil. The US currently subsidises its domestic ethanol industry, as well as maintaining tariffs on ethanol imports from Brazil.

ICTSD reporting; “Brazil signs deal to export sustainable ethanol,” REUTERS, 25 June 2008; “Biofuels: Brazil disputes cost of sugar in the tank,” GUARDIAN, 10 June 2008.