A proposal by influential WTO Members gives an indication of what is in store for that meeting. On 31 March, the United States, the European Union, Japan and Canada agreed on a ‘Quad Package on a WTO Work Programme’, which would result in virtually no change in least-developed countries’ situation within the multilateral trading system, and offers few concessions in other key areas of interest to developing countries. Quad members have been at pains to explain that the ‘package’ is an outline for discussion by WTO Members rather than a bottom-line offer, but it remains to be seen how much flexibility they are willing to exercise. Many think that no significant progress can be made on key issues without a broad-based round of new negotiations.

The package consists of two parts: proposals on implementation and enhancing transparency; and a draft decision on market access and technical assistance for least-developed WTO Members.

Transition Periods

Developing countries have sought, before and after Seattle, a general agreement on prolonging the grace periods before full compliance is expected of them for several WTO Agreements. The Quad Package contains no such blanket extensions. Instead, it suggests that ‘Members should be ready to act sympathetically and flexibly in response to duly substantiated requests from developing countries for an extension of transition periods’ under the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Agreement on Customs Valuation. The Agreement on Traderelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is not mentioned at all. Any extension requests would be considered on a case-by-case basis. As this process is in fact already underway in the Committee on Customs Valuation and the Council for Trade in Goods (see separate story on page 4), the Quad proposal arouses scant enthusiasm. At most, it offers the following specifically for LDCs: ‘In recognition of their capacity constraints, special consideration should be given to the extension of transitional periods for leastdeveloped countries under the Customs Valuation Agreement’. One way to reconcile developing countries’ demand for an acrossthe- board solution for expired transition periods and the Quad’s case-by-case approach could be to develop general guidelines for decision-making regarding extensions, but so far little has transpired on whether this would be acceptable to Members.

Three extra years could be granted, the Quad suggests, to leastdeveloped countries for the elimination of their existing measures that are inconsistent with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ‘where such application is prevented by lack of technical expertise, technical infrastructure or resources’. Assistance could also be offered with regard to problems faced by developing country Members in international standards and conformity assessments. A Special Mechanism under the General Council could be instructed to ‘work out mechanisms designed to improve the effectiveness’ of the Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on mitigating possible negative effects of agricultural liberalisation on net food-importing developing countries.

Other Implementation Concerns

Beyond these proposals, the Quad notes that ‘an implementation work programme could be established in which different committees will consider issues relating to implementation raised by Members and report to the General Council’, which ’should include a point on implementation in its agenda’. This is a far cry from developing countries’ pre-Seattle demand for a Special Mechanism under the General Council to address the imbalances in existing WTO Agreements and their implementation. The work programme proposed by the Quad would deal with issues raised by any Member, and thus presumably provide an additional avenue for examining developing countries’ compliance with WTO rules, rather than focus exclusively on their unmet expectations rising from the Uruguay Round Agreements.

As one of its priorities, the Special Mechanism was to look into the question of expiring transition periods; other items included a review of special and differential treatment provisions in the WTO Agreements. The Quad Package does not address the latter issue, and it remains highly uncertain where in the system developing countries’ implementation concerns can be addressed in a comprehensive manner, or whether some of them will be addressed at all.

Fixing the Transparency Gap

Many WTO Members now downplay the role of institutional problems and decision-making procedures as a major cause for the failed Ministerial, but the subject is still on the WTO agenda. Director-General Mike Moore characterised a late March informal General Council session on internal transparency as ‘constructive, focused and practical’, saying it yielded ’some very serious ideas [Ö] on how we can improve our play’. At the meeting, most industrialised countries, as well as several developing countries, stressed that relatively minor changes would suffice to improve the inclusiveness of decision-making.

The Quad Package follows this line of argument, proposing that informal meetings ’should be broadly representative of the WTO membership at different levels of development and reflect the breadth of substantive views on the issue being discussed. Such meetings should be followed by open-meetings in which a report is made on progress achieved, and all members are given an opportunity to express their views. [Ö] Within the context of the new programme for capacity building and technical assistance, enhanced priority should be given to supporting developing country participation in negotiations, particularly LDCs’.

Some developing countries, however, clearly disagree. At the March General Council meeting, Pakistan, Cuba, Egypt, Uganda and Zimbabwe submitted a proposal for an ‘open-ended’ process, with all negotiations taking place in plenary sessions. A workshop for African trade policy officials and negotiators, convened by the Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Initiative (SEATINI) in late March, issued a strong call for a ‘reformed WTO’ that should ‘first and foremost be developmentoriented and based on transparency, inclusiveness and representativeness’. To achieve that goal, the workshop recommended that African countries focus on ‘ensuring full transparency and opportunity for full participation by all developing countries at all stages of negotiations and ensuring a Secretariat with equitable geographic representation’ (see also page 15).

The Quad Package also outlines some steps, which ‘could be considered’ to enhance external transparency. These include, ‘with a few limited exceptions’, the immediate derestriction of working documents, Secretariat background papers, meeting minutes and agendas, as well as panel reports; enhanced contacts and exchange of information between the WTO Secretariat and NGOs; more regular symposia and other forms of informal dialogue with civil society on a broader range of WTO issues; and a review of the guidelines for consultations with NGOs. Up to now, proposals along these lines have met with a cool response from many developing countries and the Secretariat, which clearly consider internal transparency a priority over external opening.

Market Access and Technical Assistance for LDCs

The need to improve the lot of least-developed countries within the multilateral trading system is the confidence-building measure that WTO Members have most widely agreed about. Accordingly, the Director-General has held consultations among Members on what concessions they would be willing to provide to leastdeveloped countries. Not very many, it transpires, if the Quad Package is anything to go by.

The greatest disappointment resides in the deliberately vague language of the ‘Draft Decision Establishing a Plan of Action in Favour of Least-Developed Countries and a Revitalised Program for Technical Co-operation’. In it, the four major trading powers propose that developed countries grant least-developed Members ‘enhanced market access by according and implementing tarifffree and quota-free treatment consistent with domestic requirements and international Agreements, under their respective preferential schemes for essentially all products originating in least-developed countries so far as they remain in that category’ (editor’s italics).

The italicised language gives the game away: ‘consistent with domestic requirements and international Agreements’ would allow developed countries to exclude concessions in such areas as textiles, where the phase-out of quotas is already bound under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and the corresponding domestic legislation of restraining countries. Equally deliberately, the draft decision does not define what ‘essentially all products’ would entail, leaving each Member free to interpret the wording in a way that would protect domestic producers from competition from ’sensitive’ LDC products, such as agricultural commodities. The requirement that the goods must ‘originate’ in leastdeveloped countries adds an administrative hurdle designed to ensure that no trans-shipment takes place.

And finally, the reference to developed countries ‘respective preferential schemes’ makes it clear that the duty- and quota-free access would remain in the realm of enhanced but non-bound unilateral trade concessions. Many LDC goods already enjoy such preferences, and would be little better off if the Quad draft decision were adopted. Although the initiative could be marginally helpful to some least-developed countries whose products currently remain outside Quad members GSP schemes, the many qualifications in the proposal would make it easy for developed WTO Members to restrict access whenever the need arose. In contrast, least-developed countries had demanded ‘bound dutyfree and quota-free market access conditions for all products from LDCs to developed countries’, as well as favourable rules of origin and the elimination of other non-tariff barriers.

The Quad’s own weak commitments, at least as they currently stand, have made many developing countries scornful of the Quad’s proposal that they also provide least-developed Members with enhanced market access ‘to the maximum extent possible’. In addition, some developing country Members, such as Brazil and Pakistan, have expressed concern about trade diversion if least-developed countries are granted significantly better access to industrialised country markets.

On technical assistance, the major problem with the Quad draft decision is its lack of funding commitments. Although the four suggest that Members agree to ‘establish an improved programme for capacity building and technical assistance undertaken by the WTO’, they only promise to ‘undertake to work to devote adequate resources for these efforts’ (editor’s italics), instead of the US$10 million increase in the WTO’s regular budget that Mike Moore had sought to improve the organisation’s technical assistance delivery. Short of a firm commitment on funding, it seems self-serving to commit to the promotion of a ‘better understanding and use of WTO rules so that recipients are able to exploit to a maximum the opportunities offered by the multilateral trading system and enhance the capacity of recipients to adopt and implement domestic laws and regulations to fulfil their WTO obligations and participate in the system’.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that while the world’s leading trading powers eagerly grabbed the chance to ‘talk the talk’ of confidence-building and reform in the wake of the failed Ministerial Conference, they are no closer to ‘walking the walk’ than in the acrimonious pre-Seattle days.

A first attempt to deal with the aftermath resulted in bitter fingerpointing at the 17 December 1999 General Council meeting, which ultimately agreed to delay consideration of Seattle follow-up to its first session in 2000.

Since then, WTO Director-General Mike Moore has conducted a series of informal consultations with Members about the way forward, particularly with regard to improving the WTO’s decisionmaking and negotiating structures and the way to deal with expiring deadlines and provisions in WTO Agreements that were expected to be addressed through ministerial decisions at Seattle.

Built-in Agenda Negotiations Start in February

A more constructive atmosphere reigned at the General Council’s meeting on 7-8 February. Members agreed to start the built-in agenda negotiations on agriculture and services on 23-24 March and 21 February respectively, based on the provisions in the Agreements themselves. The talks will take place in special sessions of the Committee on Agriculture and the Council for Trade in Services, to be held back-to back with the regular sessions of the two bodies. The first sessions are not likely start on substantive negotiations, but will attempt to agree on a mandate, work programme and rules of procedure.

The services negotiations will be chaired by Ambassador Sergio Marchi of Canada, who was elected chairman of the Council for Trade in Services on 8 February. A vice chair will be appointed later to conduct the regular Council meetings. The respective appointments for the Committee on Agriculture were still pending when this issue went to press (see page 4 for more details about agriculture).

First Step in Confidence-building: LDCs

WTO Members have agreed that at least some of developing countries’ key concerns must be dealt with as a matter of priority in order to rebuild trust in the fairness of the multilateral trading system and get the WTO as an institution back to an even keel. At the 7-8 February General Council meeting, a number of issues of particular importance to developing countries were on the agenda, some of which stemmed directly from unfinished business in Seattle, including initiatives aimed at better integration of least developed countries (LDCs) in the multilateral trading system. WTO Director-General outlined steps taken in this direction in recent weeks, stressing that greater market access and capacitybuilding measures were ‘never to be seen as a trade-off or leverage to gain agreement to a new round of negotiations’.

In Seattle, the European Union and Japan offered duty-free and quota-free access to ‘essentially all’ products of least-developed countries but failed to secure agreement from the United States and Canada. In the EU’s case, certain ’sensitive’ agricultural products were to be excluded, whereas the US sought to leave textiles outside the initiative. Instead, the US stressed its pending legislation that would increase market access for ‘reforming’ countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, as well as greater technical assistance to LDCs.

Consultations are still going on between the Director-General and WTO Members regarding an LDC ‘package’. A progress report is expected before the Easter break.

Transition Period Extensions Still Uncertain

Deadlines for compliance with several WTO Agreements remain a major concern for most developing countries, whose transition periods for full compliance with the Agreement on Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Traderelated Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Agreement on Customs Evaluation expired on 1 January 2000. Least-developed countries have more flexibility for some of the provisions. Some progress was made at Seattle in addressing these issues, but most of the key demands never came close to being met: the US in particular continued to oppose blanket extensions of the TRIPs and TRIMs deadlines, which it said it would at the most review on a case-by-case basis. In its own draft declaration, the EU proposed a three-year extension of the transition periods of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Customs Valuation, as well as a two-year extension for the TRIMs Agreement. On TRIPs, the EU proposed accepting developing countries’ right to issue compulsory licenses to drugs on the WHO ’s essential medicines list, consideration of the relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the TRIPs Agreement, and clarifying the effect of TRIPs Article 27.3(b) on the patentability of plants and animals and biological reproduction processes.

At the General Council meeting of 7-8 February, developing countries sought a multilateral agreement on three to five-year extensions, but no decision was reached. LDCs might still obtain some as part of the package currently under preparation, but so far developing countries have only managed to secure a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ that their non-consistent measures will not be challenged until trading partners have reviewed their individual specific requests (see separate article on page 9).

Consultations will continue on the issue, which will be on the agenda of the next General Council meeting on 3 May.

Other Implementation Issues

Before and during the Ministerial Conference, a great many developing countries resisted the inclusion of any ‘new issues’ to the built-in agenda, at least until an agreement to address imbalances in existing WTO rules and provisions had been secured. These demands were dealt under the loose cluster of ‘implementation’. In addition to the deadline extensions, these included changes to some existing rules and a review of industrialised countries’ implementation of Agreements and provisions in favour of developing countries. The implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, as well as the Antidumping Agreement were particular priorities (see Bridges Year 3 No.8, pages 1 and 4).

The Seattle draft Declaration would have created a ‘Special Mechanism’ under the General Council to address the ‘remaining issues relating to the implementation of existing WTO Agreements’. The process was to be completed within a year, and trade ministers were to review the results and take ‘appropriate decisions’ on outstanding issues at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference.

Most WTO Members acknowledge that they should address the implementation of existing Agreements ñ beyond the urgent question of deadlines ñ as part of the confidence-building effort, but it is still unclear where and how this should be done. The February 2000 General Council meeting did not discuss the wider implementation problems, but informal consultations are underway between Members on how to tackle the issue in the absence of a ministerial decision. The EU has developed a proposal on the subject, which ñ with the exception of measures aimed at LDCs ñ would leave the most difficult issues to be resolved as part of a wider negotiating round (see excerpts opposite). The General Council is likely to address implementation as a separate agenda item at its meeting on 3 May.

Textiles Concessions Are Unlikely

It was obvious throughout the tortuous Seattle negotiation process that ñ in an election year, with thousands of trade unionists in the streets ñ the US would neither agree to review its slow liberalisation of the textiles sector, nor to address anti-dumping. Briefing the House Means and Ways Committee on the US trade agenda at the WTO, US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky said on 8 February that US was meeting its ‘own commitments, of course, in areas such as textiles’. Continued on page 4 The European Union, supported Hungary, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and Turkey offered to apply the stage three phase-in rate as of 1 January 2000 rather than 1 January 2002. Developing countries generally considered the offer insufficient.

Institutional Reform

One of the factors that helped derail the Seattle train was smaller countries’ exasperation at the WTO’s non-transparent ‘consensusbuilding’ procedures. Throughout the preparatory process, many of them complained about semi-official meetings where the majority of Members could not participate. In Seattle, working groups open to all delegations were set up on the clusters under consideration, but ‘green room’ meetings with far fewer participants were held simultaneously and many delegations ñ particularly from Africa and the Caribbean ñ felt that they were once again sidelined from real decision-making. Several Latin American countries and the members of the Organisation of African Unity issued statements warning that unless ‘procedures designed to secure participation and consensus’ were re-established, they would not be able to ‘join the consensus required to meet the objectives of this Ministerial Conference.’

Institutional reform, or internal transparency as it is also known, has been a subject of consultations between the WTO Director- General and Members since Seattle. The issue was not discussed at the February Council meeting, but the Director-General proposed further consultations in March, possibly in an informal Heads-of- Delegation meeting or a special session of the General Council. He also stressed that the ‘principle of consensus’ was ‘not negotiable’.

Although many Members now seem to agree that the negotiation procedures of the Seattle Ministerial were not the main cause of the failure, various approaches for increasing transparency are currently under consideration. The EU has outlined several immediate steps that could improve the preparation and organisation of future ministerial meetings, including advance agreement on the structure of such meetings, as well as a more transparent balance between ‘informal processes and open-ended meetings’. The EU and Japan have also proposed setting up an Eminent Persons Group to consider all possible WTO institutional improvements. The group would then present its recommendations for the consideration of WTO Members.

The EU’s institutional reform paper also contains a number of proposals designed to ‘enhance transparency and consultations with civil society’, such as the establishment of a formal accreditation system for NGOs or opening trade policy review meetings to parliamentarians and NGOs of the country under review. According to trade sources most developing countries are reluctant to discuss the subject. Agriculture

Although agricultural negotiations will get under way 23 March, they are expected to proceed slowly, as the principal targets of the market opening drive ñ the European Union and Japan ñ will have little incentive to make politically-sensitive concessions. In the absence of the precise negotiating mandate that was to have been agreed in Seattle, the negotiations will proceed on the basis of Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which provides for the continuation of the liberalisation process but contains no precise goals or time frames for achieving the ‘long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection’. Sub-paragraph 20(c) allows Members to take into account ‘nontrade’ concerns, as well as special and differential treatment for developing country Members while working towards the goal of a ‘fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system’.

At Seattle, Members came closer to a compromise on agriculture than is generally recognised. The latest draft text recognised developing countries’ right to special and differential treatment, which was to be ‘embodied in the schedules of concessions and commitments and, as appropriate, in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated’ so as to enable developing countries to take into account their development needs, including food security and agricultural and rural development. Paragraph 24 also provided for special attention to be paid to the situation of least-developed, net food-importing and small island developing countries.

The most controversial issues were export subsidies and multifunctionality. Virtuoso wording (paragraph 25(ii)) eventually emerged on the former where negotiations were to address ‘export subsidies, and equivalent action in respect of the subsidy component of other forms of export assistance, in the direction of progressive elimination of export subsidies’. Multi-functionality disappeared from the text, but its key components remained under non-trade concerns, which in the draft text included ‘the need to protect the environment, food security, the economic viability and development of rural areas, and food safety without prejudice to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’.

Non-trade concerns were a subject of heated debate pre-Seattle and will continue to be contentious once the negotiations start. Developing countries will seek to enlarge the ‘green box’ agricultural subsidies in order to protect food security and rural employment. The EU, Japan, Korea, Switzerland and Norway will defend ‘multifunctionality’ or the roles that agriculture plays in maintaining rural landscapes, employment and the environment. The multifunctionality argument is flatly rejected by the Cairns Group of fifteen developed and developing country agricultural exporters, which argue that eventually trade in agricultural goods must come under the same disciplines as trade in other goods.

In its statement on the EU’s post-Seattle strategy, released on 25 January, the European Commission said that while the EU would ‘participate in good faith in the scheduled negotiations’, it noted that ‘in the absence of a decision at Seattle to launch a new round as a single undertaking, there remains no time frame for the conclusion of these negotiations’. The EU has also made clear that the near-agreement reached in Seattle is now off the table and that negotiations will be pursued only on the mandate contained Article 20 of the Agriculture Agreement.

The US has warned, however, that it might significantly increase its own subsidies if Europe engages in foot-dragging. In addition, the ‘peace clause’ is due to expire in 2003. This Due Restraint Provision, contained in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture, exempts domestic support policies and export subsidy arrangements from dispute settlement challenges. ‘It’s hard for me to see a situation in which the United States would agree to an extension of the peace clause absent a new agreement,’ US special agricultural trade negotiator Peter Scher said on 12 January.

Labour

One issue united developing countries as no other in the pre- Seattle process, as well as at the Ministerial: the determination to keep questions related to labour out of the WTO. While the European Union also sought some sort of a forum to address the trade and labour linkage, it was the United States that clearly had the keenest interest, proposing a WTO working group to look into a number of sensitive questions, including child labour and respect for core labour standards (Bridges Year 3 No.8, page 14). Although US officials were careful to portray the proposed working group as only exploratory, developing countries wanted no part of it.

At Seattle, a working group on trade and labour was convened for less than an hour. The group came to no formal conclusion, but the time was sufficient to confirm that four-fifths of WTO Members were opposed to the establishment of the proposed WTO working group, as well as the joint ILO/WTO forum sought by the EU. Developing countries’ suspicions were further strengthened by President Clinton’s much-quoted comment to a local newspaper in Seattle that he would ultimately support trade sanctions for violations of core labour standards. While US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky tried to downplay the significance of the President’s remark, it served as death warrant for introducing labour discussions in the WTO in any form at all.

The US continues to include labour in its wish-list for future talks, but Charlene Barshefsky acknowledged in her testimony before Congress that the US ‘must address more effectively the reasons why many developing countries are suspicious of these discussions’. A proposal from future WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi could provide a venue for such discussions: he suggested in Seattle the convening of a once-off ’soulsearching’ forum under the auspices of a neutral institution such as the United Nations or UNCTAD. Participants would include high-level government officials, as well as representatives of relevant international organisations such as the WTO or the ILO.

Dispute Settlement

The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism is another reason why developing countries are wary of taking on additional obligations ñ including environmental ones ñ under WTO Agreements. They see trade sanctions as a very effective weapon in enforcing WTO rulings against their restrictive trade measures because the industrialised countries are their principal export markets. They are, however, acutely aware of their own limited capacity to retaliate with sanctions to violations of WTO rules the by the major players, due to the fact that their markets count only for a fraction of the overall exports of powerful trading nations. In addition, the imports are often necessary for the functioning of the local economy. Faced with this conundrum, Ecuador is currently seeking the right to retaliate in the intellectual property rights sector against the EU’s continued non-implementation of the banana rulings (see separate story on page 6).

Conclusion

In the aftermath of Seattle, most WTO Members agree that confidence-building measures must be undertaken as a priority, although the details are still unclear. Beyond that, the EU and Japan continue to push for the rapid relaunch of a broad-based single undertaking. The United States has also said it wants a round to be launched this year, but has so far shown few signs of flexibility. Developing countries have limited interest in restarting the process. Their immediate concerns focus on the extension of transition periods and establishing a mechanism for the consideration of imbalances in existing WTO Agreements.

Seattle and Sustainable Development

By Mark Halle

Among the different opinions on what happened at the Third WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, one point seems to rally everyone ñ that Seattle changed things for good. Seattle represented the demise of the old way of preparing and conducting multilateral trade negotiations. Whatever ways are devised to take the multilateral trade agenda forward, they are unlikely to bear much resemblance with the approach followed in the past.

Trust and trade-offs

So, what reforms? It is important to preface a discussion of needed reforms with a note on how progress is made in a complex, political system such as WTO. Trade negotiations are similar in many ways to straightforward commercial negotiations. They are successful if there is an adequate level of trust, and they are successful if both sides are prepared to make trade-offs.

Seattle stood little chance from the outset, because the minimal level of trust had not been developed. They stood no chance at all when it became evident that the key players had not come prepared to make the trade-offs necessary for progress to occur. In approaching WTO reform, the governing questions are: what can be done that will rebuild the trust so badly damaged in Seattle; and how can the issues be assembled on the table in such a way that the right trade-offs become possible?

The most evident levels of distrust exist between Europe and North America (though more accurately it is Europe and several others against North America and several others). This distrust is most evident around the subject of agriculture, but it is really about the purity of the trading system. GATT was easy, because it essentially dealt with tariff barriers to the flow of manufactured goods. One of the reasons for WTOís tribulations is that it has tried to go on as if the issues ñ like agriculture ñ that it now deals with were susceptible to the same sort of treatment. They are not. Much of the motivation behind Europeís insistence that the diverse functions served by agriculture be acknowledged (the multifunctionality debate) may be protectionist, but not all of it is. Nor is agriculture the only sector characterised by multiple functions. Indeed, virtually the entire WTO agenda is made up of multifunctional issues.

Distrust is alive and well also between the rich and poor countries. The latter feel both cheated and excluded. It will now be hard to win their trust without concrete measures which both offer them a better deal and a more assured place at the table.

For all their raucousness, the NGOs would not have been able to muster such energy and visibility had they not tapped into currents, which run cold and deep in societies throughout the world. The methods and alliances of some NGOs may be deplored, but at the heart of NGO rejection of the WTO system is the widely-shared sentiment that it is up to societies ñ and not the forces of capital and economic self-interest - to chose the shape and character of their world. Some way will have to be found to deal with this sentiment ñ either by co-opting the NGOs World Bank-style, or preferably by finding appropriate means to recognize and incorporate these concerns in the workings of the multilateral trading system.

The Reform Agenda

What, then, is needed? The required action can be grouped into three categories: measures to improve transparency and participation; measures to address the impact of trade liberalization on sustainable development; and improved coherence and mutual support between the trade regime and other essential elements of the global institutional and policy infrastructure.

Transparency and Participation

Of all the reforms required of the WTO, the call for more transparency and more effective participation drew the most press. In many ways it is incredible that WTO should have got away with negotiating in (literally) smoke-filled rooms for so long after everyone else had moved on to recognize that a new world requires new institutions and new ways of taking decisions.

But that is now over. The WTO will have to come to grips with enabling effective developing country participation in the trading system. It will have to find a way of allowing genuine, balanced participation from legitimate representatives of civil society. And it will have to operate in a way that is substantially more transparent than has been the case in the past. None of this is rocket science. Hundreds of other international organizations have grasped this particular nettle and turned it into a tasty soup. WTOís protests that it is different notwithstanding, it is not withstanding the wave of criticism levelled at it, and it is clear that its differentness has left the public indifferent.

Transparency measures will make it far more difficult for nations to say one thing to their public and another behind the locked doors of the WTO committee rooms. It will make it more difficult for them to agree a national position in public, then sell it out to commercial interests in private.

What applies to the WTO applies also, in spades, to national trade policy. The most diligent opponents of transparency in the WTO are countries that operate opaque systems back home. Those who oppose participation with the shrillest voices are from countries who discourage it at home. It is time to recognize that there is an emerging global standard (the Aarhus Convention symbolizes it) for transparency, participation and access to judicial processes which cannot be ignored. It is the basis of the new global governance.

One development which is clearly picking up momentum is the interest shown by parliamentarians. They can be counted on to play a more active role at both the national and transnational level, and can serve as a useful bridge between civil society and the WTO.

But participation requires more than an open door. It requires the capacity to walk through that door. Capacity to follow trade and to operate its rules in oneís own favour is severely limited, especially in the developing world, but also in non-trade sectors in the rich countries. If there is one thing that is broadly agreed, it is that there must be a considerably greater effort made to build this capacity if the trading system is to operate effectively in the future.

Calls for capacity-building echoed through the halls in Seattle, and provoked a negative backlash. Desperate for something to show for its four days of work in Seattle, the developed countries hoped to look good by promising a massive increase in resources for training. While it is needed and urgent, it sounded a tad patronizing, and did not go down well with developing countries that had deployed their existing capacity en masse and were still denied entry to the negotiating rooms.

The fact remains, however, that building capacity within governments, civil society and the research community remains a high priority, and one area where positive action can quickly be taken.

Sustainable Development

Seattle made it clear that WTOís commitment to sustainable development remains almost wholly theoretical. A dedication to the notion is carried in the Preamble to the agreements closing out the Uruguay Round, but preambular language in a binding and enforceable legal agreement carries no more weight than such language would in a contract setting out the terms of a merger between two giant corporations. What counts is what is enforceable. The rest is for public consumption.

An examination of the texts being negotiated in Seattle before the collapse repeated the preambular dedication to sustainable development, but the legal text was disturbingly free of sustainable development commitments. So have we had no impact?

It is fair to say that the WTO is now paying for its blanket disdain of any group that was not a member state. In treating friendly and constructive forces in the same way as hostile ones, it has missed the opportunity to collaborate with the former and to move forward in a way that might have afforded it some protection from the latter.

One problem is that the WTO has never been clear about the goal that trade liberalization is intended to reach. This may be because articulating such a goal would give ammunition to those who feel that WTO should be judged by the progress it makes towards that goal. If the goal is economic growth of the GDP kind, WTO will not win broad support. The goal must be wider.

The time is right for WTO to articulate its end-purpose and that end-purpose should be sustainable development or something very similar. Sustainable development would link WTO with many other international processes, but more important it would provide the basis for developing filters in the absence of which the WTO is flying blind. Is TRIPs a good agreement or a bad agreement? The answer depends on what one believes it aims to achieve. If, however, the goal were clearly sustainable development, then TRIPs could be judged on the extent to which it advances ñ or impedes ñ the achievement of sustainable development.

There is still much work to be done in looking at the real sustainable development impact of existing WTO agreements and practices, without even raising the issue of new agreements. Sustainable development is a factor in all of the WTO agreements, and not just in those issues covered by the Committee on Trade and Environment or those focused on the developing country interests. Sustainable development interests must be looked at in the context of all aspects of WTOís work. Ideally, all areas of WTOís work should contribute to the advancement of sustainable development.

The coming years will require a rededication of the WTO to broader goals, and an agreement to put all of its actions to the test of compatibility with these goals. The current wave of assessments is a good step in that direction, and will provide much empirical ammunition for the coming discussions with WTO. But the process should go further. It may be the only way to generate the confidence in WTO needed for the coming reforms.

Coherence

Hearing the WTO repeat like a mantra that trade liberalization is good for the environment, good for the poor, good for development, indeed just plain good was grounds enough for the Seattle riots. It has long been clear that trade liberalization can be good for sustainable development but only provided that trade, development and environment policies are harmonious and mutually-supportive. By and large, they are not, with the result that trade liberalization has undermined development objectives and damaged the environment.

Real compatibility among key policy sectors will not be possible until there is an equitable means of adjudicating among the different and conflicting policy objectives, and a set of principles to guide such adjudication. There is no single answer, but in respect of trade policy, it is clearly important that frontier commissions be set up to examine the interface between the different policy areas. This means both a heightened effort in areas such as the environment to achieve coherence among its own policies and positions, allowing the environmental community to negotiate with the trade area on a more nearly equal footing. It also means tying progress in trade liberalization to progress in other key areas ñ and thus achieving the trade-offs noted above.

Conclusion

Every crisis is an opportunity, and if Seattle was a disaster for the cause of liberalized trade, it was also a clarion call for change. WTO had been on a collision course with the developing countries and with social and environmental interests for some time. That they finally collided is not a surprise, although it is somewhat astonishing that the collision took place so soon and so violently.

For those who believe that the economic growth made possible by trade liberalization is a necessary ingredient of sustainable development, the debacle is the prelude to an era of exceptional opportunity (assuming that WTO does not go the hedgehog route of rolling up into a ball and aiming the bristles outwards). If we know where we would like to end up on transparency and participation, on sustainable development, and on policy coherence, it does not mean that we are clear about the best way to get there. We will need energy, creativity, and the ability to put aside old quarrels in the common search for a better outcome.

Mark Halle is the European Representative of the International Institute for Sustainable Development and the Chairman of the Board of ICTSD

On attribue essentiellement l’échec des négociations à des questions procédurales, en particulier la difficulté de gérer le processus de négociation de manière transparente et permettant la participation active de toutes les délégations ainsi qu’à des désaccords sur les questions traditionnellement difficiles telles que l’agriculture, les textiles et les mesures anti-dumping. Ce résultat illustre les changements difficiles auxquels l’OMC doit faire face alors que ses Membres sont de plus en plus “surveillées” par la société civile et le pouvoir législatif. Pour Malini Mehra, Directrice de “People’s Decade for Human Rights Education”, “l’échec des négociation est l’occasion pour l’OMC de retourner à des questions de base. L’experience de Seattle a démontré que l’OMC doit entreprendre des réformes fondamentales pour que ses accords profitent à l’ensemble de ses Membres ainsi qu’à l’environnement”.

L’échec des pourparlers reflète également les difficultés du système à servir efficacement les intérêts d’une majorité de pays en développement et de pays en transition. Charlene Barsheflsky (USA), présidente de la Conférence, a déclaré en substance, à ce propos, que les procédures de négociation qui étaient adaptées par le passé ne sont plus valables aujourd’hui à l’OMC.

Les délégués impliqués dans les négociations se sont exprimés de manière contradictoire quant à savoir qui étaient les gagnants et les perdants de l’échec des pourparlers. Plusieurs ont regretté d’avoir manqué la chance d’inclure tout une série de thèmes qui faisaient pratiquement l’objet d’un consensus tels que les liens entre le régime de l’OMC et la mondialisation, la dette, le système financier international, les transfers de technologie ainsi qu’un large appui en faveur d’un véritable programme de coopération technique pour les pays en développement. D’autre part, des questions telles que les conséquences négatives des subventions et d’autres politiques commerciales ainsi que la gestion des pêcheries qui figuraient sur le dernier “draft” de la déclaration ministérielle, ont également été mises en suspens.

La préoccupation la plus grande exprimée par les pays en développement résidait, cependant, dans le fait d’avoir manqué ou retardé une opportunité d’ouvrir certains marchés, d’un intérêt capital dans leurs stratégie de développement, à leurs exportations. Finalement, certains ont exprimé des regrets quant à l’absence de réponses concrêtes du système à la nécessité d’aborder les questions sociales et environnementales dans le cadre des accords de l’OMC.

Il est prévu que les négociations reprennent à présent à Genève sur la base des progrès accomplis à Seattle. La révision et la poursuite de la libéralisation dans le domaine des services et de l’agricultrue prévues dans le programme incorporé du cycle d’Uruguay commenceront, pour leur part, en janvier.

Esta suspensión de la Conferencia evidencia los difíciles cambios que el sistema multilateral de comercio atraviesa a medida que sus Miembros, escrutados de cerca por la sociedad civil y los parlamentos, reorientan la OMC hacia el interés público. También refleja las dificultades que enfrenta el sisetma cuando se intenta hacer oír la voz de la mayoría de las economías en desarrollo. En palabras de Charlene Barshefsky (EE.UU.), Presidenta de la Conferencia, “hemos descubierto que la OMC ha superado sus procedimientos, apropiados para tiempos pasados”.

Los delegados involucrados en las negociaciones expresaron visiones contradictorias sobre el balance de ganadores y perdedores. Muchos se lamentaban de la oportunidad perdida de avanzar en temas sobre los que ya había consenso, como las vinculaciones del régimen de la OMC con la globalización, la deuda, las finanzas internaciones, la transferencia de tecnología y la cooperación técnica. También quedaron en suspenso temas como el compromiso de enfrentar los efectos problemáticos de los subsidios y otras medidas de política comercial sobre el manejo de los recursos pesqueros, que aparecía en el último borrador de Declaración que se discutió. Las principales preocupaciones expresadas por países en desarrollo se referían a las oportunidades perdidas o postergadas de abrir mercados de interés crítico para sus estrategias de crecimiento. También fue un factor de división la falta de respuestas apropiadas a los reclamos relacionados con el tratamiento de cuestiones ambientales y sociales.

Está previsto que las negociaciones continúen en Ginebra una vez que el Director General haya consultado con las delegaciones, construyendo sobre el ‘progreso’ logrado en Seattle. La revisión y liberalización de los regímenes sobre agricultura y servicios mandadas por los acuerdos de la Ronda Uruguay comenzarán en enero.

The failure was primarily attributed to acrimony over procedural issues, specifically the difficulty of managing the negotiating process in a transparent and inclusive manner, together with disagreements over traditionally difficult issues (i.e.: agriculture, textiles and anti-dumping). This outcome evidences the painful change which the multilateral trading system is undergoing as its Members — whose activities are now intensely scrutinised by civil society and legislators — shift the direction of the WTO towards public interest. Said Malini Mehra, Director of People’s Decade for Human Rights Education, ‘The collapse of talks is a great opportunity for the WTO to return to basics. Seattle has dealt a slap to the WTO and the organisation must fundamentally reform itself and reassert the centrality of its social mission to bring benefits to its entire membership and the environment.’

The postponement of the talks also reflects the hefty swing of the system as it strives to service a majority of developing and vulnerable economies. In the words of Ambassador Barshefsky (US), Chair of the Conference, ‘we found that the WTO has outgrown the processes appropriate to an earlier time’.

Delegates involved in the negotiations expressed contradictory views on the balance of winners and losers from this outcome. Many regretted the missed opportunity to insert issues which had practically gained consensual support such as the connections of the WTO regime with globalisation, debt, international financial issues, technology transfer, and strong support and guidance for a real technical cooperation program. Issues such as a commitment to deal with the problematic effects of subsidies and other trade policy measures and fisheries management, both of which appeared in the latest drafts, were put on hold. The biggest concerns expressed by developing countries referred to lost or delayed opportunities for the opening of markets of critical interest for their growth strategies. The lack of operative responses to claims to adequately manage social and environmental concerns within the agreements was also divisive.

Negotiations are scheduled to continue now in Geneva once the Director General’s attempts to build on the ‘progress’ achieved in Seattle yield the necessary conditions. Review and further liberalisation in Agriculture and Services as mandated in the Uruguay Round’s built-in agenda will commence in January.

L’américaine Charlene Barshefsky (USTR), présidente du « group of the whole » - le comité qui réunit l’ensemble des membres de l’OMC - est chargée de rassembler les textes soumis par les présidents des divers groupes de négociation et de les compiler sous forme de déclaration ministérielle. A l’heure où PASSERELLES est mis sous presse, certains groupes de négociation sont encore en discussion et les résultats des pourparlers n’ont pas encore pu être examinés dans le cadre du . committee of the whole. . A en juger par les dernières discussions, on s’attend à ce que les Ministres passent une grande partie de la nuit et de la journée de vendredi à négocier.

Transparence dans le processus de négociation

Sir Shridath Ramphal, ancien Ministre de la Guyane et représentant de la Communauté des Caraibes, a fortement critiqué, au noms d’une série de petits pays, le manque de transparence dans le processus de négociation. Il a notamment condamné les innombrables réunions bilatérales, plurilatérales et autres « green room » dont ces petites délégations ne sont pas informées et a cité le cas d’un Ministre des Caraibes qui se serait vu refusé l’accès à une réunion de négociation.

Plusieurs délégations et groupes sous régionaux se sont également plaints de l’atmosphère dans laquelle se déroule la troisième Conférence ministerielle. Ainsi un draft de communiqué conjoints des pays d’Amérique Latine et des Caraibes a circulé hier. Il condamne le manque de transparence et l’intention d’arriver à une déclaration sans assurer leur participation ce qui pouvait mettre en danger la possibilité d’arriver à un consensus sur la déclaration. Le texte de ce communiqué n’a pas encore été officialisé et il semble qu’il sera adouci voire pas distribué du tout. L’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (OUA) a également rédigé un texte. Celui-ci, en revanche, est plus dur et menace de bloquer le consensus sur la déclaration ministérielle si les préoccupations des pays africains ne sont pas prises en considération.

Un point de vue totalement opposé a néanmoins été exprimé par Charlene Barshefsky qui a affirmé que le processus de négociation avait été ouvert et transparent comme jamais dans l’histoire du GATT et de l’OMC. Le Commissaire européen, Pascal Lamy a, pour sa part, estimé que la question de la transparence et de la participation interne devrait faire l’objet d’une Conférence ministérielle complète. Une transparence absolue, impliquant des décisions prise par 135 membres bloquerait tous progrès, selon lui. La difficulté consiste à mettre en place un processus de négociation à la fois transparent et efficient, sur une base multilatérale.

Nouvelle proposition sur l’agriculture

Un nouveau texte sur l’agriculture a été présenté hier par le président du groupe sur l’agriculture, M. George Yeo, Ministre de Singapour. Ce texte semble être le fruit d’un compromis entre les positions du Groupe de Cairns et des Etats-Unis d’une part et de l’Union européenne d’autre part. Il ne s’agit néanmoins pas d’un texte négocié ni définitif. Des changements peuvent intervenir en fonction du résultat des négociations dans les autres groupes. Le terme multifonctionalité a disparu du texte. Celui-ci ne mentionne que la nécessité de prendre en compte des « préoccupations non-commerciales » et fait référence, notamment, à la protection de l’environnement, la sécurité alimentaire et le développement des zones rurales. Selon des sources proches des négociateurs, l’Union européenne pourrait être prête à renoncer à mentionner la multifonctionalité si les Etats-Unis renoncent à vouloir introduire une phrase demandant que l’agriculture soit sujette aux mêmes régles que les autres secteurs.

Concernant l’accès aux marchés, le texte prévoit des négociations devant aboutir à la plus large libéralisation possible, en particulier concernant les produits intéressant les pays en développement. Il demande également la réduction des soutiens internes. La formulation du paragraphe concernant les subventions tient de l’exploit. Celui-ci tente de concilier à la fois la volonté des Etats-Unis et du Groupe de Cairns d’éliminer les subventions et celle de l’Union européenne de réduire toute forme d’assistance à l’exportation (y compris les mesures utilisées aux Etats-Unis). Concrétement, le texte demande la réduction des subventions y compris dans d’autres formes d’assistance à l’exportation « dans la direction de l’élimination progressive des subventions à l’exportation ».

En ce qui concerne les pays en développement, le texte prévoit que le traitement spécial et différencié soit partie intégrale des négociations y compris pour les pays les moins avancés, les pays importateurs net de produits alimentaires et les Etats insulaires. Ce traitement devrait leur permettre de prendre en compte de manière plus effective leurs besoins de développement en matière de sécurité alimentaire et de développement rural.

Peu de progrés sur la mise en oeuvre

Selon plusieurs observateurs, l’essentiel du travail reste à faire d’ici le 3 décembre dans le groupe de négociation sur la mise en oeuvre. Les Etats-Unis ont soumis leur propre proposition et se sont fortement opposés aux paragraphes figurant dans le texte du premier décembre sur la mise en oeuvre dans le domaine des subventions, des régles anti-dumping et des textiles, pourtant largement soutenu par plusieurs délégations. Le président du groupe de négociation, le Ministre Canadien Pierre Pettigrew a envoyé un texte mis à jour à Charlene Barshefsky, la présidente du « committee of the whole » qui est chargée de compiler tous les textes issus des groupes de travail. Celui-ci contient une série de décisions immédiates, des qestions à négocier, un nouveau plan d’action pour l’intégration des pays les moins avancés et le renforcement de la coopération technique pour les pays en développement.

Un représentant de l’OMC a décrit le texte comme contenant des améliorations par rapport à la version de mercredi. En particulier, des « progrés allant dans la direction des propositions des pays en dévelopement ». Parmi ces changements, la possibilité de ne pas pouvoir appliquer le système de régelement des différends de l’OMC à certaines dispositions des ADPIC et une prologation des délais de mise en oeuvre pour les pays en développement. La nouvelle version déplace également plusieurs des questions traitées dans l’Annexe II (à décider plus tard) vers l’Annexe I (décicions possibles à Seattle). De plus, le texte sur les pays les moins avancés et la coopération technique semble plus substantiel que celui de la version du premier décembre. Le gourpe de négociation devrait se réunir de manière plus ou moins continue aujourd’hui de sorte à arriver à un consensus.

Controverse autour des normes de travail

Un cinquième groupe de négociation a été mis . péniblement - sur pied en fin de journée, hier, pour discuter des questions liées au commerce et aux normes sociales. Cela concenre, en particulier, la proposition des Etats-Unis de créer un groupe de travail à l’OMC ainsi que celle de l’Union européenne d’établir un forum OMC-OIT sur les normes de travail. Hong Kong a demandé des informations sur le statut de ces deux propositions qui ne figuraient dans aucun des groupes de négociation. Hong Kong craignait que la question ne réaparaisse au dernier moment et qu’elle mette en danger l’ensemble des résultats de la ministérielle. C’est en réponse à cette demande qu’un groupe de négociation présidé par le vice Ministre du Costa Rica, a été créé pour décider si la déclaration devait contenir une directive pour la mise en place d’un organe, quel qu’il soit, sur les normes de travail. Au cours de la première réunion du groupe les délégations ont discuté durant longtemps les raisons de la création d’un tel groupe. Sur le fond, elles n’ont pourtant pas réussi à trouver un consensus. Suite à la réunion, les discussions semblent s’être poursuivies dans de petits groupes.

Groupe systémique: rien ne bouge

Le groupe systémique s’est réuni pour la première fois hier. Il a abordé des questions telles que la mise en circulation des documents, la transparence de l’OMC et la participation du public dans les travaux de l’organisation. La proposition des Etats-Unis qui envisage la création de nouveaux cannaux de communication entre l’OMC et la société civile ainsi que la création d’un organe consultatif a reçu l’appui de l’Union européenne, de la Norvège, du Japon et de la Suisse mais n’a pas fait l’unanimité. De nombreuses délégations se sont prononcées pour le status quo en faisant référence aux débordements violents qui se sont déroulés durant la ministérielle. A moins d’une surprise, la déclaration ne devrait donc pas aller au delà de la pratique actuelle.

Proposition sur les ADPIC

Les discussions du Groupe de négociation sur les nouveaux thèmes se sont suspendues hier vers 23h30. Le président a présenté un texte sur les ADPIC issu de discussions dans un groupe restreint. Celui-ci préconise, notamment d’examiner dans le cadre du Conseil des ADPIC, et avec d’autres organisations internationales, la possibilité de couvrir les questions de propriété intellectuelle liées aux connaissances traditionelles et au folklore dans le cadre des ADPIC ou par d’autre moyens au niveau national et international.

Pas d’accord sur l’initiative 0 tarif

L’Union Européenne (UE), les Etats-Unis, le Canada et le Japon ne sont pas encore parvenus à un accord sur les préférences tarifaires pour les pays les moins avancés (PMA). La proposition originelle de l’UE prévoyait l’élimination de tous les obstacles tarifaires sur les produits des PMA et leur consolidation dans le cadre de l’OMC. Pourtant, l’UE a annoncé qu’elle devrait envisager des exceptions sur les bananes, le boeuf, le riz et le sucre car, selon les représentants de l’UE, les accords de Lomé interdisent la discriminiation entre pays développés et PMA en matière tarifaire. De son côté, le Président Clinton a annoncé des exceptions pour les textiles. Il a de plus ajouté que même s’il était prêt à accroître les préférences tarifaires, il maintiendrait la possibilité de retirer ces préférences si les pays concernés ne respectaient pas les normes international de travail.

Transparencia: paradojas de la Conferencia de Seattle

Uno de los temas centrales el día de ayer fue el de la transparencia de la Conferencia. Este término tiene una doble connotación: transparencia . interna’, es decir las características del proceso negociador en términos de la claridad y acceso de los países a la toma de decisiones, y transparencia . externa’, es decir, el acceso de las entidades no gubernamentales al proceso de negociación.

La paradoja en Seattle es que esta Conferencia parece haber mejorado significativamente la transparencia externa (en comparación a anteriores conferencias) pero empeorado la transparencia interna. Tarde en la noche de ayer, parecía haber un principio de consenso en el grupo sobre cuestiones sistémicas en torno a un texto que instruye al Director General para que formule recomendaciones al Consejo General de julio del 2000 con el objeto de mejorar la tranaparencia interna y externa, en el entendimiento de que la segunda se limita a mejorar las actividades de informacióna al público sobre los beneficios del sistema multilateral de comercio, lo cual no representa avance alguno respecto de la Declaración Ministerial de la Segunda Conferencia, y no refleja la mejoría en la forma en que de hecho se trató la participación de las ONG en esta Conferencia respecto de las anteriores.

Las delegaciones de los países latinoamericanos discutieron ayer la posibilidad de emitir una dura declaración criticando la forma en que se ha manejado el proceso de negociación. La declaración aún no ha sido consensuada pero refleja el estado de ánimo de muchas delegaciones, preocupadas por el acceso restringido a ciertas reuniones, la posibilidad de que se produzca un texto ministerial inconsulto y los problemas de desorganización que signaron la reunión. Esta queja es compartida por delegaciones de varios otros países en Africa y Asia, quienes ven que, pese a la naturaleza abierta de los grupos de negociación, las decisiones se toman en grupos pequeños y excluyentes.

La invitación abierta a todas las delegaciones que desearan formar parte de los distintos grupos de negociación no ha favorecido la agilidad del trabajo, sobre lo cual comentó la Comisión Europea, la que a través de Pascal Lamy expresó preocupación porque el proceso no logra combinar adecuadamente transparencia con eficiencia. Lamy sugirió que la OMC deberá establecer en el futuro un mecanismo de negociación que permita un amplio acceso sin entorpecer la agilidad de las negociaciones.

Poca discusión sobre medio ambiente

A medida que los grupos se concentraban en la negociación de los temas centrales, las discusiones sobre las múltiples referencias al medio ambiente contenidas en los borradores de Declaración Ministerial fueron quedando relegadas. Al momento del cierre de este boletín, el grupo sobre nuevos temas aún no había abordado cuestiones propuestas, como la inclusión del principio precautorio, la relación de la OMC con los acuerdos ambientales multilaterales y el rol del Comité de Comercio y Medio Ambiente en una nueva Ronda.

En materia de derechos de propiedad intelectual, el grupo sobre nuevos temas trabajaba sobre un texto que instruiría al Consejo del ADPIC examinar el alcance de la protección de la propiedad intelectual en relación con los conocimientos tradicionales.

La propuesta de creación de un grupo sobre biotecnología parecía avanzar, con EE.UU. y la UE cerca de un acuerdo sobre un Grupo de Trabajo para examinar . los procedimientos de aprobación establecidos para productos desarrollados con nuevas tecnologías con efectos sobre el acceso a mercados, como por ejemplo la biotecnología agrícola. . El grupo tendrí primero una etapa de investigación en la que se debería tomar en cuenta el trabajo que se desarrolla en otros organos multilaterales (en aparente referencia al Protocolo de Bioseguridad). Luego de la Cuarta Conferencia Ministerial, de haber consenso, el grupo desarrollaría propuestas de disciplinas para el acceso a mercados de los productos de la biotecnología agrícola. La cuestión seguía generando divisiones en la UE. En un almuerzo organizado por ONG, los ministros de medio ambiente de Dinamarca e Inglaterra señalaron que la propuesta de la UE se había originado en la Comisión Europea pese a que no tenía mandato de los países para ello y admitieron que desconocían la misma hasta que fue lanzada en la Conferencia.

En materia de subsidios a la actividad pesquera, el grupo sobre implementación trabajaba sobre una propuesta que instruiría a la OMC para que trabaje junto con la FAO y otros organismos internacionales en la identificación de los subsidios que contribuyen a la sobre-capacidad pesquera o que distorsionan el comercio, y clarifique o fortalezca las disciplinas relevantes del acuerdo sobre subsidios y medidas de salvaguardia.

Finalmente, el destino de la iniciativa de liberalización acelerada, que incluye entre otros sectores los productos forestales, era todavía incierto.

Países en desarrollo ven pocos avances en grupo sobre implementación

Según observadores, el grupo de negociación sobre implementaón aún tiene mucho trabajo por delante. EE.UU. ha presentado su propia propuesta sobre implementación y ha objetado enérgicamente varios párrafos del anterior texto en lo relativo a subsidios, antidumping y textiles. El presidente del grupo, Pierre Pettigrew, Ministro de Comercio de Canadá, envió un texto revisado a la presidente del Comité del Pleno, Charlene Barshefsky, para ser agregado a los textos de los demás grupos. El nuevo texto contiene propuestas de decisiones inmediatas, temas de nuevas negociaciones y un nuevo plan de acción para la completa y efectiva integración de los países menos desarrollados al sistema multilateral de comercio y el fortalecimiento de la cooperación técncia para estos países.

Un funcionario de la OMC describió el documento del grupo como una mejora respecto de las anteriores versiones, al contener progresos sustantivos en las demandas de los países en desarrollo. Caben destacar entre las modificaciones la posibilidad de no aplicar el mecanismo de solución de diferencias de la OMC a ciertas áreas del ADPIC y la extensión de los plazos de ese acuerdo para los países en desarrollo.

El grupo continuaba reuniéndose en la madrugada de hoy.

Comienza a vislumbrarse acuerdo sobre agricultura

Un nuevo texto de Declaración sobre agricultura fue presentado ayer por el presidente del grupo, George Yeo de Singapur. El texto sería fruto de un compromiso entre las posiciones del Grupo Cairns, EE.UU. y la UE, aunque aún no es una versión definitiva ya que está sujeto, entre otras circunstancias, al desarrollo de las negociaciones en los demás grupos. El término . multifuncionalidad’ ha desaparecido en este texto, aunque quedan mencionadas las preocupaciones no comerciales, específicamente la protección del ambiente, la seguridad alimentaria y alimenticia y el desarrollo de las zonas rurales. Según fuentes cercanas a los negociadores, la UE estaría dispuesta a renunciar la mención a la multifuncionalidad si EE.UU. renuncia a la introducción de una frase demandando que la agricultura se sujete a las misma reglas que los demás sectores.

En cuanto al acceso a mercados, el texto señala que las negociaciones deberán conducir a la más amplia liberalización posible, particularmente en relación a productos de exportación de interés para los países en desarrollo. También menciona la reducción sustancial de todas las formas de subsidios a la exportación, así como los componentes de subsidio en otras formas de asistencia a las exportaciones, con miras a su progresiva eliminación.

Las propuestas de negociación deberán presentarse antes del 1 de julio del 2000, en tanto que las negociaciones sobre compromisos y textos legales deberán concluirse antes del 15 de diciembre del 2002.

Sorpresiva creación de grupo sobre normas laborales

Un sexto grupo negociador surgió imprevistamente ayer para abordar la cuestión del comercio y las normas laborales, con las declaraciones de Bill Clinton respecto a la eventual aplicación de sanciones comerciales por violación de normas laborales acordadas en la OMC como trasfondo. Pese a que EE.UU. y la UE habían presentado propuestas de creación de un grupo en la OMC para examinar este tema, ninguna de las propuestas aparecía en los borradores de Declaración Ministerial y por lo tanto no fueron incluidas en el mandato de ninguno de los grupos de negociación. Hong Kong solicitó información sobre el estado de estas propuestas para evitar que fueran presentadas a último momento y forzada su aceptación con el argumento de evitar el colapso de los acuerdos logrados en las demás áreas. Como resultado de este pedido se estableció un grupo presidido por Costa Rica para decidir si la Declaración de Seattle debía incluir una directiva para establecer algún tipo de órgano sobre el tema. El grupo creado se reunió por 40 minutos en los que quedó claro que la gran mayoría de los Miembros de la OMC se oponen a la creación de semejante órgano. Las discusiones en grupos pequeños continuaban durante la noche.

Países latinoamericanos rechazan propuesta europea sobre banano

Honduras, Panamá, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Guatemala y Nicaragua presentaron una declaración conjunta en la que rechazan la propuesta de la UE sobre la modificación a su régimen del banano mandada por el mecanismo de solución de diferencias de la OMC. Los Ministros de Comercio de estos países, en conferencia de prensa, señalaron varias críticas al régimen propuesto, entre ellas los insuficientes niveles de cuotas asignadas, el sistema de licencias y en general la estructura discriminatoria de la misma.

Los ministros expresaron también su malestar ante la decisión del Ecuador (principal exportador de banano a Europa) de no sumarse a la declaración conjunta. Esta decisión del Ecuador se debe a su desacuerdo con el texto acordado por los demás ministros. En esencia, la diferencia entre el Ecuador y los demás países radica en que el primero sostiene que la UE, luego de las decisiones de los Paneles, debe adoptar un régimen de libre competencia y no de cuotas, en tanto que los segundos prefieren un régimen que mantenga el sistema de cuotas, aunque con algunas condiciones.

Reuniones de ONG

Una multitudinaria reunión de ONG acreditadas a la Conferencia se realizó ayer bajo el auspicio del Third World Network. En la misma se escucharon dos presentaciones en las que se informó sobre el proceso de negociación y se realizaron críticas al mismo. Entre otros planteos, se mencionó la falta de transparencia del proceso negociador, resaltandose la gravedad de que las propias delegaciones oficiales de los países en desarrollo muchas veces no sepam qué está ocurriendo, y se destacó la insistencia de los países en desarrollo en que se de especial importancia a los temas de implementación.

Por otra parte, varias ONG estarían preparando una declaración en la que se pronunciarían sobre la experiencia de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil en esta Conferencia. Parecería haber una opinión generalizada de que la Conferencia de Seattle ha sido a este respecto una experiencia muy positiva, planteandose ahora desafíos importantes para el futuro.

A working group on trade and labour was established on 2 December under unusual circumstances. Although the United States and the European Union had both tabled proposals for a group to examine this contentious issue, neither proposal figured on any of the ministerial draft texts, and thus did not fall under the mandate of any of the WTO negotiating groups. Hong Kong requested information on the status of the proposals in order to make sure that no eleventh hour surprise would be produced at a stage when it would be too late to refuse it without undoing the entire Seattle results. As a result of this request, a working group, chaired by Costa Rica, was established to decide whether the Seattle Ministerial Declaration should contain a directive to set up some kind of body to look into the trade and labour relationship. The working group only met for forty minutes. Although no formal conclusion was reached, it was clear that four-fifths of WTO Members firmly opposed the creation of any such body. Discussions continued in small groups late into the night to determine whether some compromise formulation might be found.

The US proposal to set up a WTO Working Group on Trade and Labour was practically a non-runner before the deliberations began, and the more so after President Clinton said on Wednesday that establishing the working group was only the Administration’s first goal. ‘[A]nd then that working group should develop these core labour standards, and then they ought to be part of every trade agreement, and ultimately I would favour a system in which sanctions would come for violating any provision of a trade agreement,’ the President said on his arrival in Seattle, surrounded by angry demonstrators many of whom were trade unionists.

On Thursday, US Trade Representative Barshefsky tried to reassure developing country delegates that including sanction-backed labour provisions in WTO provisions was only a long-term policy goal and not part of the proposed working group’s mandate, but her ensurances clearly failed to convince developing countries. A way ahead might lie in something along the lines of the EU’s proposal for a Joint ILO/WTO Standing Forum on Trade, Globalisation and Labour to examine a broad range of issues related to trade and labour. Commissioner Lamy stressed on Thursday that the EU did not believe that trade sanctions were an appropriate means of promoting respect for core labour standards.

Transparency of Negotiations Emerges as a Major Issue

The WTO should hold a Ministerial Conference just to determine how to conduct trade negotiations in a transparent yet efficient manner, EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy told the press on Thursday. While all delegations must be involved in decision-making, progress on a vast agenda of complex issues would be impossible to achieve if 135 countries were to seek consensus without breaking into smaller groups. Transparent, efficient and multilaterally-agreed negotiating procedures must be put into place, Commissioner Lamy said.

The present working group/green room system is perceived as non-inclusive and high-handed about small economies’ concerns, as witnessed by numerous complaints, particularly by the smaller delegations. Statements were drafted on Thursday by several Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as the Organisation of African Unity on the lack of transparency and participation in the negotiations. Both draft statements, not yet finalised or released at press time, expressed concern over ‘the stated intentions to produce a ministerial text at any cost, including the modification of procedures designed to secure participation and consensus,’ and warned that unless the situation were remedied, the signatories would not be able to ‘join the consensus required to meet the objectives of this Ministerial Conference’. While it was unclear late Thursday night whether the statements would actually be presented, the anger and frustration of the signatories was very clear indeed.

Sir Shridath Ramphal, a former foreign minister of Guyana and the Chairman of the Caribbean Communities, expressed grave concern over the general lack of transparency at the Ministerial talks. Citing an instance where a Caribbean minister was barred from attending a Green Room discussion on agriculture, Ramphal said part of the blame for the process rested with the WTO. He was also doubtful that there would be any successful conclusion to the Ministerial. ‘This is a conference convened before its time,’ he said.

Ambassador Barshefsky, on the other hand, said that multilateral trade negotiations had never been conducted in a more open and participatory manner than in Seattle. Unlike in Singapore, for instance, there were five (six, with the later-established labour group) open-ended working groups on clearly-defined subjects where all Members could participate, instead of small, semi-secret gatherings of key countries forging text between themselves and presenting it at the eleventh hour for the approval of Members. As of Thursday morning, the substance of all bilateral and plurilateral discussions undertaken by the Chair must be reported to the entire working group before it is forwarded to the Committee of the Whole.

Multifunctionality Disappears from Chair’s Ag Draft

A new draft on agriculture was presented on Thursday by the agriculture working group Chair George Yeo of Singapore. The text seems a compromise between the positions of the Cairns Group and the United States, on the one hand, and the European Union on the other. However, it is not a negotiated draft and changes are likely to be introduced depending on the outcomes of the other negotiating groups. The term ‘multifunctionality’ has disappeared from this version, which only notes the need to take into account non-trade concerns, such as food security and rural development. According to sources close to the negotiations, the European Union could be prepared to renounce explicit reference to multifunctionality if the US were to give up the demand to include a reference to the ultimate goal of bringing trade in agricultural products under the same rules as trade in other goods.

With regard to market access, the text proposes that the negotiations should lead to the broadest possible liberalisation, particularly concerning products of special interest to developing countries. It also requires reductions in domestic support. The paragraph on subventions is a sheer wonder of negotiated compromise: it attempts to reconcile the US/Cairns position that the Seattle Round should ‘eliminate export subsidies’ and the European stance that the negotiations should result in ‘reductions in all forms of export assistance’ (including export credits, state guarantees, etc.). This reconciliation effort yields the following: ‘Substantial reductions in all forms of export subsidies, and equivalent action in respect of the subsidy component of other forms of export assistance, in the direction of progressive elimination of export subsidies’.

Developing Countries See Little Movement on Implementation

According to some observers, much work remains to be done over 3 December in the working group on implementation. The US has submitted its own proposal on implementation and has objected strongly to paragraphs from the previous 1 December implementation text on subsidies, anti-dumping, and textiles, contrary to the positions of most delegations. Developing countries in particular are pushing for movement on outlining future talks on these and other areas such as Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).

The Chair of the working group, Canadian Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew, has sent an updated text to the Chair of the Committee of the Whole, US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, for compilation with texts from the other working groups. The new, scaled-down implementation language contains proposed immediate decisions, subjects for negotiations, a new plan of action for the full and effective integration of Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) into the multilateral trading system and reinforcement of technical cooperation for developing countries.

One WTO official described the implementation document as an improvement over the version released on 1 December, as it demonstrates ’substantive progress towards the demands made by developing countries.’ Notable among the changes is a possibility for non-applicability of the WTO Dispute Settlement system to certain areas of the Agreement on TRIPs and an extension of deadlines for developing countries’ commitments under TRIPs.

The new text has also moved many of the issues found on the 1 December version’s Annex II (for later decisions) to the higher priority Annex I (Possible Decisions at Seattle on Implementation). In addition, there is substantiated text on LDCs and on technical cooperation that was not on the 1 December document. One official hinted that negotiations in the implementation group were linking up with payoffs in Agriculture and New Issues groups.

The working group on implementation will be meeting more or less continually through 3 December in an effort to secure agreement on the contentious issues.

Market Access Group

The working group on Market Access focused its 2 December discussions on the modalities for determining how market access talks would be conducted in the context of a new round. Members remain in disagreement over whether to work towards a ‘zero-for zero’, or a ‘formula’ approach, for instance. A number of delegations are proposing a so-called ‘common approach,’ which would facilitate comparisons of tariff reduction proposals. The Accelerated Tariff Liberalisation (ATL) initiative was also discussed, but there was little progress on any issues other than methodologies for framing future market access negotiations. Inside the Convention Centre, forestry activists berated the US for its support for ATL.

New Issues Group

Like discussions in the Market Access working group, there was little forward movement in the Singapore, or New Issues, group. Similar to 1 December, Members spent most of their time focused on investment and competition. As a result, other areas under this heading such as trade facilitation, environment, and government procurement received scant attention. The talks on investment and competition remained inconclusive; the EU remains the strongest supporter of including these areas under the negotiating mandate for a new round. In a related incident, José Bové, a vocal French farmer’s representative, engaged in a heated discussion with EU Director of Press and Public Affairs Willy Helin. Inter alia, Bové called for increased pressure for negotiating an agreement on competition policy ‘in order to stave off the growing influence of monopolising agriculture firms such as Monsanto and Cargill.’

Food and Agriculture Day at NGO Forum

Passionate discussion took place on 2 December at the United Methodist Church in Seattle. Mark Ritchie from the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy and Vandana Shiva moderated sessions on TRIPs, food security and transparency. Both spoke of the urgent need to make changes to WTO policies on agriculture. Shiva and Ritchie want the rights of farmers and communities respected and demand equality for developing country concerns.

Walden Bello from Focus on the Global South spoke of the need to remove agriculture negotiations from the current WTO agenda. ‘The dumping of exports from the developed countries to South East Asia has caused much dislocation amongst farmers,’ he argued, ‘while trade has driven many farmers from their land.’

Panel speakers including Anuradha Mittal from Food First and Doreen Stabinsky from the Council for Responsible Genetics spoke firmly on the issue of biosafety. It is currently the burden of countries opposing the import of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to scientifically prove that these organisms are harmful or damaging to health. The burden of proof needs to shift, they said. The question of what is ’sound science’ was also heavily debated by panelists.

Environment Ministers Urge Delegates to Take Meaningful Steps on Sustainable Development

The issue of GMOs and the Biosafety Protocol was further discussed at a Seattle Host Committee luncheon on Trade and the Environment on 2 December. Sved Auken, Minister for Environment and Energy in Denmark, told delegates and NGOs that countries such as the US must not force WTO rules onto the Biosafety Protocol. He argued that if countries make trade rules override the Biosafety protocol, it will further weaken other MEAs and encourage countries to discount these very important international environmental laws. The minister stressed that this was the most controversial political issue facing international negotiators in Seattle.

Auken also raised the issue of WTO public status. ‘The fact that many people see the WTO as ‘bad’ needs to be taken seriously,’ he said. ‘It would not be possible to leave Seattle without the inclusion of the environment because this will be a cause for disaster.’

Together with Auken, UK Environment Minister Michael Meacher urged the summit to ensure that the declaration from Seattle balance trade interests with environmental imperatives. ‘We cannot continue to ignore the dramatic imbalance between the rich and poor nations of the world,’ stated Meacher. ‘Urgent steps must be taken by this summit to introduce truly sustainable international trade that benefits everyone.’ Despite statements from many Members — notably the US and the EU — advocating greener trade and sustainable development, substantive movement on inputting environmental language in substantive Declaration sections has yet to transpire, particularly in the ‘New Issues’ working group.

CUTS Meetings Address Anti-Dumping, Dispute Settlement, Environment and Labour
Together with Nepal-based South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment (SAWTEE), the Centre for Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) — a prominent Indian consumer advocacy organisation — convened its second of two daily workshops on 2 December. Entitled ‘Anti-Dumping and the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism,’ the panel featured speakers from a diversity of environmental, academic, consumer and private sector organisations.

A highlight of the meeting was the proposition that the use of anti-dumping measures are often used as a political tool to appease domestic protectionist lobbies and are not based on logical assessments of economic realities. A more strategic application of anti-dumping actions was proposed that would be based on designing effective legal cases first, supported by the later threat of anti-dumping duties. With respect to the fuller participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement system, panel members pointed to the need for technical assistance supported by domestic capacity-building. Beatrice Chaytor of the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development emphasised the importance of internal capacity-building, particularly in terms of training lawyers to bring developing country concerns to the WTO in effective ways.

The 1 December CUTS workshop, entitled ‘The Vexed Issue of Linkages,’ addressed environment and labour standards and their use as trade measures. Speaking on the occasion, noted trade expert Professor Jagdish Bhagwati was categorical that although an interface exists between trade and environment, this is not an area that should be adjudicated by the WTO. On the question of labour, he added that concerns pertaining to labour standards could be addressed by ‘putting teeth’ in the mouth of the International Labour Organisation. Pradeep Mehta of CUTS forwarded the argument that child labour is a complex socioeconomic phenomenon and thus trade sanctions are the wrong mechanism to deal with this issue.

DSU Review Winds Its Way Onto Seattle Agenda

Although mention of the review of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) will not be part of a Ministerial Declaration, Members are expected to aim to include a decision on it for ‘Immediate Decisions at Seattle’. In addition to all other items on the WTO’s agenda, informal consultations on Dispute Settlement review are proceeding, chaired by the Japanese Minister Suzuki.

Funcionarios europeos se mostraron visiblemente contrariados al tener que responder a preguntas sobre el inesperado cambio de posición de la UE sobre el establecimiento de un grupo de trabajo sobre biotecnología en la OMC, propuesta hasta ahora impulsada sólo por EE.UU. y Canadá. Según la propuesta europea, los ministros acordarían en Seattle establecer un grupo de trabajo con el mandato de investigar las relaciones entre el comercio, el desarrollo, la salud, el consumo y el medio ambiente en una era de rápidos avances en biotecnología.

La propuesta, elaborada por la Comisión Europea e incluida en el borrador de Declaración Ministerial circulado por la UE (ver mas abajo) sorprendió no sólo a organizaciones no gubernamentales, sino también a varios miembros de la propia UE. Los ministros de medio ambiente de Francia, el Reino Unido, Italia, Dinamarca y Bélgica emitieron una declaración indicando que el establecimiento del grupo en la OMC frustraría las negociaciones del Protocolo de Bioseguridad (el único foro apropiado, según los ministros, para decidir sobre una aproximación multilateral a los temas de biotecnología) al subordinar las negociaciones en el segundo al desarrollo de las discusiones en el primero, sentando además un precedente problemático para las relaciones de la OMC con otros acuerdos multilaterales sobre medio ambiente.

Esta preocupación también motiva la presencia en esta Conferencia del Ministro de Medio Ambiente de Colombia, quien preside las negociaciones sobre el Protocolo. Los países latinoamericanos han mantenido silencio sobre este punto, aunque la Argentina, Uruguay y Chile podrían estar de acuerdo con la creación del grupo en la OMC. Estos países verían en este grupo una forma de evitar un Protocolo de Bioseguridad con disposiciones más estrictas que afectarían sus exportaciones de productos genéticamente modificados (como la soja transgénica).

Se especulaba ayer sobre las motivaciones detrás del cambio de posición de la UE. Aparentemente, la Comisión decidió favorecer la creación del grupo para lograr apoyo para su propuesta de incorporar el principio precautorio en la OMC. Ante las contradicciones que se han hecho visibles en la UE sobre este tema (ayer se comentaba sobre la magnitud de este malestar interno cuando los ministros de medio ambiente europeos no asistieron a una conferencia de prensa a la que habían convocado), la Comisión Europea emitirá un comunicado aclarando su posición. El comunicado indicaría que la UE no es demandante de un grupo de trabajo sobre biotecnología y que el trabajo del mismo debería proceder sólo si se dan ciertas condiciones, como por ejemplo que EE.UU. y países como Argentina, Canadá, Chile y Uruguay se compromentan a trabajar constructivamente para concluír las negociaciones sobre el Protocolo de Bioseguridad.

Grupos de negociación avanzan

La primera sesión del grupo de negociación sobre agricultura giró en torno a un documento de trabajo presentado por el presidente del grupo (Singapur) que recoge tanto el texto de la propuesta europea, como el del Grupo Cairns (apoyado por EE.UU.) y el borrador de declaración acordado en Ginebra en octubre. La mayoría de las delegaciones han reiterado sus posiciones sin que se avisore consenso aún. Los principales temas en discusión son la asistencia a la exportación, el acceso a mercados y el apoyo doméstico a la producción. Ni la multifuncionalidad ni el trato especial y diferenciado para países menos desarrollados parecen ser temas centrales en este momento.

Cairns y EE.UU. exijen la eliminación de todos los subsidios a la exportación, en tanto que la UE prpone una reducción, e insiste en que se incluyan otras formas de asistencia como los créditos a la exportación.

El grupo sobre implementación abordó temas como la extensión de los períodos de transición para los países en desarrollo, que podría darse caso por caso (EE.UU. se opone a una extensión genérica), el acceso a los mercados para los países menos desarrollados y la asistencia técnica.

Varios observadores estiman que las dicusiones del grupo sobre acceso a los mercados logrará un acuerdo sin mayores dificultades, en tnato que en el grupo sobre nuevos temas los debates se han concentrado sobre inversiones y competencia.

La UE toma la iniciativa

La UE parece haber tomado la iniciativa en las negociaciones con la presentación de un borrador de Declaración Ministerial organizado en un capítulo sobre objetivos generales, uno sobre implementación de acuerdos existentes, uno sobre una nueva ronda de negociaciones y uno sobre decisiones a tomar en Seattle. El borrador contiene una multiplicidad de referencias a cuestiones de desarrollo sostenible, entre los que caben destacar:

• La interpretación de que el Art. 31 del Acuerdo sobre los Derechos de Propiedad Intelectual relacionados con el Comercio (ADPIC) permite a los países en desarrollo emitir licencias obligatorias para medicamentos que aparecen en la lista de medicamentos esenciales de la Organización Mundial de la Salud. La licencia obligatoria es un reclamo de grupos, como Médicos sin Fronteras, preocupados por los altos precios y la carencia de medicamentos para enfermedades básicas en países pobres.

• El inicio de trabajo para examinar las relaciones del ADPIC con la Convención sobre Diversidad Biológica y la adaptación del ADPIC, en una nueva ronda, a los más recientes desarrollos legales y tecnológicos, así como el examen del alcance del Acuerdo en relación al conocimiento tradicional, especialmente de las comunidades indígenas.

• La revisión del trato especial y diferenciado para hacer estas disposiciones más operativas.

• La asignación de un rol más importante para el Comité de Comercio y Medio Ambiente y el Comité de Comercio y Desarrollo durante la nueva ronda.

• La inclusión de la multifuncionalidad de la agricultura en las negociaciones sobre el sector (incluyendo la seguridad alimentaria, la protección de los animales y el medio ambiente).

• La adopción del principio precautorio.

• La decisión en Seattle de crear un grupo de trabajo sobre biotecnología.

La mayoría de estas propuestas son rechazadas por los países en desarrollo, y son varios los observadores que consideran que estas menciones, en su gran mayoría, han sido incluidas como ‘moneda de cambio’ en otras áreas. Algunos negociadores consideran que no deben esperarse acuerdos significativos sobre temas ambientales más allá de una mención preambular.

La iniciativa de liberalización acelerada Las delegaciones de EE.UU. y la UE ofrecieron versiones contradictorias sobre la supuesta aceptación por parte de la última de la iniciativa de eliminación acelerada del comercio en ocho sectores de bienes no agrícolas. EE.UU. confía que la UE aceptará la iniciativa una vez que se adicionen dos nuevos sectores no especificados. Pero por su parte, Pascal Lamy, Comisionado para el Comercio de la Comisión Europea, dijo que la UE estaba dispuesta a poner todos sus aranceles industirales sobre la mesa sin prorizar ningún sector. Entre los sectores de la iniciativa se encuentran el de pesca y productos forestales. Grupos ambientalistas se oponen a la liberalización en este último, argumentando que la misma conduciría a mayores tasas de deforestación.

Relaciones de la OMC con el Banco Mundial

Una de las consecuencias que trae la insistencia con la dimensión de desarrollo presente en la retórica de esta Conferencia es que la importancia de las relaciones entre la OMC y el Banco Mundial, el FMI y la UNCTAD aparecen como un tema cada vez más importante. En sus presentaciones al pleno de la OMC, los representantes de estos organismos hicieron énfasis sobre la importancia de reconocer que el comercio internacional es un tema inmerso en problemáticas más amplias, a las que no puede ser ajeno.

Los ejes de la llamada coherencia entre la actividad del Banco Mundial y la OMC se relacionan con dos temas fundamentales: a) La cuestión de la implementación de los Acuerdos de la Ronda Uruguay, especialmente en lo relativo a permitir a los países en desarrollo aumentar su participación en los beneficios de la liberalización. En este aspecto, la discusión está en cómo el trabajo de promoción del desarrollo del Banco sirve para mejorar la inserción de estos países en el sistema multilateral de comercio; b) Las diferentes visiones que tienen del desarrollo ambas instituciones, con la OMC dando un lugar central al comercio y el Banco Mundial partiendo de la reducción de la pobreza como temas organizadores de la promoción del desarrollo. Las discusiones y decisiones de esta Conferencia Ministerial probablemente marcarán con fuerza el futuro de las relaciones entre estas instituciones. La propuesta de la UE menciona, entre los objetivos generales, el de continuar con la liberalización y la creación de normas en consonancia con los objetivos de desarrollo y erradicación de la pobreza, permitiendo a los países en desarrollo, en particular los menos adelantados, gozar de los beneficios del sistema multilateral de comercio.

Iniciativa para países menos adelantados

EE.UU. y la UE lanzaron hoy sus iniciativas para los países menos desarrollados. En el caso de EE.UU., la propuesta se funda en medidas unilaterales de este país, como la ampliación del Sistema General de Preferencias y la provisión de asistencia técnica, en tanto que la propuesta Europea es de eliminación de aranceles, discutiéndose si esta debe ser para todos los productos o para algunos, y si la reducción sería consolidada o no.

Los países beneficiados son en su casi totalidad africanos y caribeños, lo cual plantea para América Latina, en el caso de la propuesta Europea, la disyuntiva de apoyar un régimen preferencial y por lo tanto discriminatorio para sus propios productores, oponerse a la iniciativa (que debe ser aprobada por el Consejo General de la OMC como una excepción especial) o aprovecharla para negociar concesiones en otros sectores. Esta última alternativa aparece como la más atractiva, aunque podría perjudicar las posibilidades de que la iniciativa se implemente efectivamente.

Reuniones de ONG

Las actividades de ONG continuaron hoy, abordándose diversos temas. Entre otras, hubo discusiones sobre:

El acuerdo de la OMC sobre propiedad intelectual: En torno a este asunto hubo discusiones sobre el acceso a medicinas y el sistema de propiedad intelectual negociado en la OMC (se argumenta que el sistema de patentes, como está acordado en el ADPIC, encarece las medicinas esenciales y entorpece su diseminación en los países más pobres. También hubo discusiones sobre el ADPIC y la Convención sobre biodiversidad (cuestiones como la exigencia de que los procesos y productos derivados de la biodiversidad tengan un origen legítimo) y la legislación de EE.UU. sobre patentabilidad de microorganismos.

El principio precautorio: Entre otros aspectos se discutió la incorporación de este principio a la OMC (propuesta por la UE), coincidiendo varios expertos en la inconveniencia de hacerlo, ya que es posible aplicarlo caso por caso sin necesidad de ajustar las normas del sistema multilateral de comercio.

Derechos humanos y derechos de los trabajadores: Entre los argumentos vertidos, se dijo que las obligaciones comerciales deben insertarse en el contexto más amplio del derecho internacional y los compromisos sobre derechos humanos. En reunión aparte, sindicalistas de EE.UU., Brasil, Sudáfrica, Malasia y Hong Kong insistieron que los avances en los derechos de los trabajadores son críticos para mejorar la calidad de vida y el desarrollo apropiado de las naciones. Argumentaron en favor del establecimiento de un grupo de trabajo en la OMC, pero estimaron que no era el momento de definir las formas específicas de vincular el tema al sistema multilateral de comercio.

Les représentants européens étaient visiblement embarassés par les questions qui leur ont été posées concernant le changement de position de l’Union européenne (UE) sur la mise en place d’un groupe de travail sur la biotechnologie. Plusieurs journalistes et ONG ont même mis en doute l’autorité de la Commission de faire une telle proposition qui a surpris non seulement le public mais également les membres l’UE. Ce qui est en cause est la proposition de l’UE de créer un groupe de travail devant examiner les relations entre le commerce, le développement, la santé, l’environnement et la protection des consommateurs dans le domaine de la biotechnologie. Les Ministres de l’environnement de la France, du Royaume Uni, de l’Italie, du Danemark et de la Bélgique ont immédiatement réagi en plubliant un communiqué. Celui-ci déclare que les négociations sur le protocole de biosécurité - le seul forum dans lequel cette question devait être abordée – seraient menacées par l’établissement d’un tel groupe de travail. Cela pourrait en effet subordonner les négociations au processus en cours à l’OMC ce qui constituerait un précédent dans les relations entre l’OMC et les accords multilatéraux sur l’environnement.

Les spéculations allaient bon train quant à ce que l’UE avait obtenu en échange d’un groupe de travail sur la biotechnologie qui était essentiellement poussé en avant par les Etats-Unis et le Canada, tous deux membres du Groupe de Miami. Selon des sources proches des négociateurs, l’UE aurait pu s’attendre, en contrepartie, à moins de restistance de la part des Etats-Unis sur la question du principe de précaution auquel l’UE tient beaucoup.

Intérrogé à maintes reprise sur la question, le Commissaire européen à l’agriculture, M. Fischler s’est montré très embarassé et n’a pas répondu. Un communiqué de presse de l’UE – pas encore publié – semble vouloir appaiser les esprits et expliquant davantage l’objectif du groupe de travail. Celui-ci précise que “l’Europe n’est pas demandeur” d’un tel groupe précise le communiqué. Il ajoute que la priorité reste la conclusion rapide du protocole sur la biosécurité.

Nouvelles des groupes de négociation

Tous les groupes de négociation ont tenu hier leur première réunion à l’exception du groupe systémique qui ne se réunira que jeudi. Contrairement à ce que l’on pensait, toutes les délégations ont finalement accès aux groupes de travail. Chaque matin, se réunit également le “Committee of the Whole” qui rassemble toutes les délégations avant qu’elles ne se séparent en groupe de travail.

Les discussions de la première séance du groupe de négociation sur l’agriculture, qui s’est déroulée hier matin, se sont basées sur un document de travail présenté par le président du groupe (Singapour) reprenant á la fois le texte de la proposition de déclaration européenne (voir ci-dessous), le texte du Groupe de Cairns appuyé par les Etats-Unis et une partie de la déclaration du 19 octobre.

La plupart des délégations ont surtout répété leur position et, á l’heure actuelle, aucun consensus ne se dessine. Comme on l’attendait, les principaux désaccords ont été entre l’Union européenne (UE) d’une part, et le Groupe de Cairns avec les Etats-Unis d’autre part. S’ils ont porté essentiellement sur des questions de formulation, ils cachent néanmoins de profondes différences de vue. La question du traitement spécial et différentié et les questions d’importance pour les pays en développement - sécurité alimentaire, développement rural, importateurs de produits alimentaires - n’ont par contre pas fait l’objet de débats mais seront discutées aujourd’hui. Ce qui explique peut-être pourquoi ceux-ci n’ont pas participé activement aux discussions.

Les Etats-Unis et le groupe de Cairns veulent une intégration du secteur agricole aux régles et disciplines de l’OMC mais l’UE insiste sur le statut particulier de l’agriculture. Dans cette otpique, elle veut que les négociations se basent sur l’Article 20 de l’Accord sur l’agriculture. Celui-ci reconnait le statut particulier du secteur agricole même s’il prévoit de nouvelles réformes.

Sur la question des subventions Cairns et les Etats-Unis demandent l’élimination de toutes les subventions á l’exportation, alors que l’Union européenne demande une réduction. De plus l’UE ne parle pas de “subventions á l’exportation” mais “d’assistance á l’exportation”, pour couvrir également les mesures en vigueur aux Etats-Unis dans ce domaine mais qui n’entrent pas strictement dans la définition de subventions.

L’UE parle également de la nécessité de tenir compte des préocupations non comerciales (non trade concerns) comme le rôle multifonctionel de l’agriculture - les questions de protection des zones rurales, de l’environnement, de la qualité des produits agricoles, de la sécurité alimentaire et de la protection des animaux. Les Etats-Unis et le Groupe de Cairns, par contre, ne veulent pas entendre parler de multifonctionalité, un terme qu’ils jugent flou et qui pourrait servir comme moyen d’élargir les exceptions á la libéralisation. Ils estiment également que l’accord est déjà assez flexible pour adapter ces préoccupations. Un nouveau document de travail est attendu aujourd’hui.

Les négociations du groupes sur la mise en oeuvre et les régles ont suivi le même processus que celui sur l’agriculture et ont été basées sur un document très long et détaillé. Parmi les thèmes abordés, la possibilité de délais plus long, notamment pour les ADPIC et les MIC et la renégociation de certains accord (essentiellement sur les subventions, les textiles et les mesures anti-dumping). Les discussions du groupe sur l’accès aux marchés semblent plus faciles, surtout sur les services et, bien que le document de travail discuté durant la réunion reste pour l’essentiel entre crochet, plusieurs obsérvateurs estiment qu’il devrait être possible d’arriver à un consensus. Quant au groupe sur les nouveaux thèmes, les débats se sont concentrés sur l’investissement et la concurrence. Les pays n’ont fait que répéter leur position et un compromis parait plus improbable que jamais. Aujourd’hui, les délégués devraient aborder des questions telles que l’environnement, les marchés publiques et la cohérence.

La déclaration ministérielle de l. UE L’UE semble avoir pris l’initiative dans les négociations avec la présentation de sa proposition de déclaration ministérielle. Au cours de la journée de mercredi, la proposition de déclaration ministérielle de l’UE a été largement distribuée par les ONG. La déclaration décrit les objectifs généraux de la négociation puis consacre un chapitre à la mise en oeuvre des accords existants, un chapitre sur le nouveau cycle de négociations et un chapitre sur les décisions à prendre à Seattle.

Concernant le développement durable, les objectifs généraux mentionnent la nécessité de “maximiser les synérgies positives entre la libéralisation du commerce la protection de l’environnement et le développement économique”. Le chapitre sur la mise en oeuvre prévoit une série de décisions, notamment dans le domaine des ADPIC où elle autorise la mise en place de licences obligatoire pour les médicamments faisant partie de la liste de médicamment essentiels de l’OMS. Cette revendication a surtout été portée en avant par l’ONG Médecin sans Frontières Elle demande aussi l’examen des liens entre les ADPIC et la Convention sur le Biodiversité. Le traitement spécial et différencié doit être examiné et rendu plus efficace. Finalement, le texte propose la mise sur pied d’un méchanisme destiné à résoudre les questions de mise en oeuvres qui doivent être négociées.

Comme prévu, le texte propose un round global. Les négociations devraient être supervisées par un Comité de négociation. Parmi les thèmes du nouveau cycle de négociation, on retrouve les investissements directs, la concurrenceune, l’agriculture, les services, les ADPIC, les textiles, les mesures anti-dumping, les achats publiques et l’environnement. Sur cette dernière question, la déclaration fait particulièrement référence aux relations entre l’OMC et les accords multilatéraux ainsi que sur le principe de précaution lorsque les preuves scientifiques manquent pour évaluer les risques sur l’environnement. Finalement, la déclaration propose un groupe de travail sur la biotechnologie, l’établissement d’un forum de travail OMC/OIT sur les normes de travail et envisage une série de décisions sur le commerce électronique, l’initiative 0 tarif, la coopération technique et la révision du système de réglement des différends.

Les normes du travail discutées avec passion

Lors de la réunion de CUTS, un débat passionné a eu lieu entre opposants et partisans de liens entre le commerce, les normes du travail et l’environnement. Le représentant du WWF a mis l’accent sur la nécessité de rapporocher l’Agenda 21 de Rio et les règles de l’OMC. Il s’est opposé à tout débat sur des sanctions pour faire respecter les normes environnementales et sociales.

J. Bagwathi, economiste indien, s’est opposé à tout lien avec ces normes au sein de l’OMC. La discussion devant se faire à l’OIT et au PNUE. Il a mis l’accent sur l’ambiguite de ces liens lorsque la question de l’accès aux marchés des pays développés est posée en même temps. Il a dénoncé le droit que se donnent certains pays d’ imposer les termes de discussion du fait de leur position dominante à l’OMC. Plusieurs intervenants ont mis en doute la crédibilité des positions de certaines puissances (Europe et Etats-Unis notamment) en montrant les contradictions dans leurs positions – par exemple concernant la Chine avec qui des accords ont été passés sans référence aux Droits de l’Hommes.

Le representant d’ICFTU a fait prévaloir la nécessité d’etablir un lien entre commerce et normes du travail, en faisant ressortir les conditions de travail des femmes et des enfants dans certains pays asiatiques dans le secteur du textile, ainsi que l’absence de droits sydicaux. Il a mis en lumière le role des multinationales dans le maintien de conditions de travail difficiles par l’etablissement de compétition entre pays. Dans le même temps, certains intervenants ont fait remarqué que les pays développés ne respectent pas toujours leurs engagements internationaux, notamment ceux de la Conférence de Rio ou du sommet social pour aider les pays en développemt à améliorer les conditions de travail. Les sanctions auxquelles les pays développés pourraient avoir recours ont été jugées inacceptables par l’IATP car elles seraient unilaterales et asymétriques. Des sanctions ne devraient être prises que quand elles sont demandées par la societe civile et dans des cas graves – comme l’apparthied. Notons que les Etats Unis continuent de demander que cette question soit traitée au sein de l’OMC. Les pays Latino-americains et africains se sont dans leur grande majorité exprimés pour que la question soit discutées dans le cadre de l’OIT.

Dans son discours à la session plénière, le futur Directeur Général de l’OMC, le Thailandais Supachai Panitchapakdi a déclaré que les pays en développement seraient plus en confiance si la question était traitée à un haut niveau par une institution neutre telle que la CNUCED ou l’ECOSOC. Dans une conference de presse il a réitéré son point de vue selon lequel toute discussion sur l’utilisation de sanctions, confirmerait les suspicions des pays en développement, et les amènerait probablement á retirer leur appui aux nouvelles négociations.